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CHEFfER v. RENO: IS THE REGULATION OF ABORTION CLINIC
PROTESTS THE REGULATION OF
INTERSTATE COMMERCE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the 1930s, the United States Supreme Court often inter-
preted Congress's power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United
States Constitution, the Commerce Clause, narrowly.' Since then, the
Supreme Court has instead found that the Commerce Clause encompasses
nearly every congressional action purporting to relate to commerce, thus,
allowing Congress to regulate many facets of American life.2 In 1995, how-
ever, the Supreme Court, for the first time in over fifty years, held that a
congressional act did not fall under the Commerce Clause.3 Despite this
ruling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Chef
fer v. Reno4 held that the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
("FACE") 5 represented a constitutional exercise of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause.6
The extent of abortion related violence in the United States has in-
creased greatly in recent years.7 More than 1,000 acts of violence against
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have the Power ... To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes."). For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, see infra notes 48-121 and accompanying text.
2. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 158 (1990) (" [T] he expansion
of Congress's commerce ... powers has reached a point where it is not possible to
state, that as a matter of articulated doctrine, there are any limits left."); PHILIP B.
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 51-97 (1970) (dis-
cussing federalism and its demise); Edward S. Corwin, Passing of Dual Federalism, 36
VA. L. Rxv. 1, 2 (1950) (discussing shift of power toward consolidated national
power); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1494
(1994) (noting that some commentators believe "federalism is 'dead,' Congress is
free to run berserk" (citing MARTIN H. REDISH, CONSTITUTION AS POLrrIcAL STRUC-
TURE ch. 2 (1994)). For a discussion of the breadth of the Commerce Clause, see
infra notes 48-121 and accompanying text.
3. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that Gun Free
School Zone Act ("GFSZA") was unconstitutional because it did not fall within
Commerce Clause). For a further discussion of Lopez, see infra notes 108-21 and
accompanying text.
4. 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994). For a discussion of the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act ("FACE"), including its text, see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying
text.
6. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1517. For a further discussion of the Cheffer court's ra-
tionale, see infra notes 122-50 and accompanying text.
7. Feminist Fund Survey Finds Violence at Half Nation's Abortion Clinics, AP, Nov.
4, 1993, available at 1993 WL 4565718; Colleen O'Conner, Frustration Fueling In-
crease in Anti-Abortion Violence: Extremists'Attacks on Clinics Are Becoming Cruder, Mak-
(867)
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abortion providers and more than 6,000 clinic blockades and other disrup-
tions occurred between 1977 and 1993.8 These acts included "36 bomb-
ings, 81 arsons, 131 death threats, 84 assaults, two kidnappings, 327 clinic
'invasions,' and one murder."9 That one murder, the murder of abortion
provider Dr. David Gunn in 1993, brought the issue of abortion clinic vio-
lence to the forefront of public discourse.10 In response to this violence,
ing Them More Difficult to Track Down, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 21, 1994, at Al
("Bombing and arson fires at abortion clinics have risen sharply since 1991.").
Some see the violence as the 1,528,930 abortions performed each year. Katherine
A. Hilber, Constitutional Face-Off" Testing the Validity of the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 143 (1995). Others, however, see the vio-
lence as the attacks on abortion clinics and abortion service providers. Id. Con-
gress attempted to reduce the latter type of violence by enacting FACE. H.R. REP.
No. 103-306, at 6-7 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.S.C.A.N. 699, 703-04 (discussing
Congress's rationale behind enactment of FACE); S. REP. No. 103-117, at 31
(1993) (same). For a further discussion of FACE, see infra notes 43-47 and accom-
panying text.
8. H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 703-04; S. REP. No. 103-117, at 7; see Laura Griffin,
Violence in the Name of God, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 23, 1994, at Al (reporting
on violence surrounding abortion debate). See generally DALLAS A. BLANCHARD &
TERRY J. PREwrIT, RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE AND ABORTION: THE GIDEON PROJECT 1
(1993) (reviewing major incidents of abortion violence).
9. H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 703-04. House Report 306 specifically discusses
several instances of abortion violence:
In 1991, a two-year campaign of blockades and invasions was launched
against the only medical facility offering abortion services in North Da-
kota. Arrests were made on ten occasions in the first seven months. On
one of these occasions, 26 people stormed the clinic, broke down a door,
and chained themselves together inside the facility. In Witchita, Kansas,
clinics were targeted by Operation Rescue from July through August of
1991. Hundreds of people came from across the country and engaged in
acts of trespass and obstruction that overwhelmed local law enforce-
ment's ability to respond. This 46-day blockade resulted in more than
2,600 arrests and a cost of over half a million dollars to local government.
In April 1992, Operation Rescue targeted Buffalo, New York, causing 605
arrests of blockaders and trespassers and almost $400,000 in government
costs. Less publicized but more frequent blockades have taken place reg-
ularly for years in places like Dobbs Ferry, New York (1,000 arrests in four
year period for police force of 23 officers) and in northern Virginia.
Id. at 704. In addition, House Report 306 concludes that there has been a rise in
butyric acid attacks: "In 1992, [the National Abortion Federation] recorded 57 of
these attacks with estimated clean-up costs of almost half a million dollars. From
January 1, 1993, through May 5, 1993, there were 14 reported attacks, with clean-
up costs alone totalling over $65,000." Id. at 706. Abortion protestors inject the
acid into the clinics through key holes and under doors. Id. One injection can
shut down a clinic for up to a week. Id.
10. Id. at 704. Dr. Gunn was shot during an anti-abortion rally outside the
Pensacola, Florida clinic at which he worked. Id.; see FBI Is Urged to Investigate Abor-
tion Foes: Slaying of Doctor at Fla. Clinic Spurs Call for Federal Action, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Mar. 11, 1993, at A1 ("Two congressmen and three abortion-rights groups
called today for a wide-ranging FBI probe of the anti-abortion movement, saying
the slaying of a doctor in Pensacola, Fla., caps a decade of arsons and bombings at
family planning clinics .... [Congressmen Edwards and Shumer] also urged pas-
sage of [FACE]."); Garry Mitchell, Doctor Is Killed Outside Abortion Clinic, NEW ORLE-
ANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 11, 1993, at Al (reporting on shooting of Dr. David
[Vol. 41: p. 867
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Congress passed FACE and President Bill Clinton signed it into law on
May 26, 1994.11
Following the enactment of FACE, several pro-life groups filed chal-
lenges to the statute. 12 Most notable was the suit filed by Myrna Cheffer
and Judy Madsen. 13 They strongly opposed abortion and attempted to
persuade pregnant women to find other alternatives. 14 Their efforts con-
sisted of distributing literature, oral protest and sidewalk counseling.1 5
Although they were not arrested or charged with violating FACE, Cheffer
and Madsen complained that fear of punishment under FACE "chilled"
their activities. 16
Cheffer and Madsen made several claims in their attempt to strike
down FACE. The most notable of these claims challenged the constitu-
tional power of Congress to enact the law. 17 Specifically, they alleged that
Gunn); Mike Williams, Doctor Slain at Abortion Clinic in FKa.: Pensacola Demonstrator
Is Charged with Murder, AT ANTAJ. & CONST., Mar. 11, 1993, at Al (same).
11. Clinton Signs Bill Barring Abortion Clinic Blockades, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
May 27, 1994, at A12 (reporting President Clinton's signing of FACE into law);
President Clinton Signed an Abortion Clinic Blockade Bill, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1994, at
Al (same); see also Catherine Albisa & Lenora M. Lapides, Protecting Speech; Prevent-
ing Violence; Ensuring Access to Reproductive Health Care: How Do We Draw the Lines?, 14
ST. Louis U. PUB. L. Rjv. 495, 496-97 (1995) ("Recognizing the severity [of abor-
tion violence,] the United States Congress enacted [FACE] in an attempt to curtail
the violent tactics ...."); Carole Golinski, Note, In Protest of NOW v. Scheidler, 46
ALA. L. Ruv. 163, 207 (1994) ("President Clinton signed [FACE] into law in an
effort to create a federal remedy and provide federal protection to those seeking to
exercise their right to an abortion.").
12. Cheffer v. Reno, No. 94-0611-CIV-ORL-18, 1994 WL 644873, at *1 (M.D.
Fla. July 26, 1994) (seeking "declaratory and injuctive relief enjoining Defendants
from enforcing the recently enacted Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of
1994"), affd, 55 F.3d 1517 (lth Cir. 1995); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno,
855 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1994) (challenging constitutionality of FACE and filing
motion for preliminary injunction against its enforcement), affid, 47 F.3d 642 (4th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995); seeLinda Feldman, Anti-Abortion Protests
Face Tough New Obstacles, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 17, 1994, at 3 ("Anti-Abor-
tion groups are gearing up to fight [FACE]."). In addition to preliminary constitu-
tional challenges, protesters actively sought to be charged under FACE in order to
challenge the statute. See Abortion Foes Plan to Challenge New Law Banning Blockades,
N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1994, at A20 (quoting opponents of abortion as saying they
planned to challenge FACE with legal action and civil disobedience); Bill Against
Abortion Protests Signed: Foes File Challenges Even Before Clinton Approves Measure, ARiz.
REPUBLIC, May 27, 1994, at A4 (noting that challenges were filed before President
Clinton even signed FACE into law); Lyle Denniston, Abortion Clinic Bill Becomes
Law and Immediately Is Challenged, BALT. SUN, May 27, 1994, at A3 (noting that chal-
lenges to FACE were filed as it was signed into law).
13. Cheffer, 1994 WL 644873, at *1 (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
enjoining enforcement of FACE).
14. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1519 (1lth Cir. 1995).
15. Id. Madsen admitted to participating in trespass on several occasions, but
Cheffer claimed that her activities did not violate any laws. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. In addition, Cheffer and Madsen raised several other claims. Id. In
particular, they charged that the statute was "vague and overbroad, content and
viewpoint based, and acted as a prior restraint, in violation of their First Amend-
1996] NOTE
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Congress lacked the power to enact the statute under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.18 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, however,
and ruled that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to
pass FACE.19
This Note analyzes the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Cheffer v. Reno.
Part II provides the backdrop upon which the Eleventh Circuit reviewed
Cheffer. Part II first reviews the legislative history and purpose of FACE,
and also addresses the specific statutory language. 20 Part II then outlines
the history of Commerce Clause litigation with particular emphasis on the
Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez.2 1 Part III dis-
cusses the Cheffer court's rationale. 22 Part IV then critiques and criticizes
the Eleventh Circuit's application of Commerce Clause jurisprudence to
FACE. 2 3 Finally, Part V discusses the implications of the Cheffer decision
and discourages future courts from following the Eleventh Circuit's
reasoning.24
II. BACKGROUND
A. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
1. Legislative History of FACE
The congressional investigation into abortion clinic protest violence
began with one hearing in the 102d Congress.2 5 Then, in the 103d Con-
ment free speech rights." Id. They further claimed it "violate [d] the First Amend-
ment's Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993"
and that it "imposes excessive fines and is cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment." Id. at 1518-19.
18. Id. at 1519. Appellants asserted that FACE infringes upon state authority
under the Tenth Amendment because Congress lacked authority to pass the Act.
Id. For a further discussion of the Tenth Amendment implications, see infra notes
52-53 and accompanying text.
19. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1521 ("[FACE] is a constitutional exercise of the Con-
gress's power under the Commerce Clause."). For a further discussion of the opin-
ion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, see infra notes
122-50 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of FACE, see infra notes 25-47 and accompanying
text.
21. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). For a further discussion of Lopez, see infra notes
108-21 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the court's rationale in Cheffer, see infra notes
122-50 and accompanying text.
23. For an evaluation of the Cheffer court opinion, see infra notes 151-87 and
accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the impact of the Cheffer decision, see infra notes 188-
92 and accompanying text.
25. H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 7-8 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.S.C.A.N. 699,
700 (noting that 102d Congress held hearings on legislation similar to FACE). In
that Congress, a bill similar to FACE was pending before the Congress and the
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, which called
an oversight hearing regarding blockades of abortion clinics. Id. The Subcommit-
tee failed to act, however, thus killing the legislation for that Congress. For a re-
870
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gress, the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime and
Criminal Justice held two hearings on the FACE proposal.2 6 The first
hearing studied the "issue of intimidation and violence other than clinic
blockades against providers of reproductive health services, patients, and
clinic facilities."2 7 The second hearing, held at the minority members'
request, illustrated the range of nonviolent pro-life activities and explored
the violent activities of pro-choice advocates.
28
Concurrently, the Senate held a hearing on the proposed legisla-
tion.2 9 During this hearing, the Senate learned about the extent of pro-
view of the legislative history of FACE, see Helen R. Franco, Note & Comment,
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994: The Face of Things to Come?, 19 NOVA
L. REv. 1083 (1995). In particular, the first hearing investigated the need for Fed-
eral relief to deal with the violence. H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 700 (characterizing
abortion violence as "orchastrated blockades" and stating that remedy was needed
to "deal with these organized and targeted activities"). To this end, the Subcom-
mittee heard testimony from victimized women, legal experts and pro-life activists.
Id. at 701. Specifically, the following individuals testified: Ms. Sylvai "Doe," Ms.
Vicki Robinson, Ms. Kathryn Maxwell, blockade victims; Constitutional Law Pro-
fessor Cass Sunstein; Mr. John H. Schafer, co-counsel with NOW Legal Defense
Fund; Mr. Sam Ellis, Chief of Police for Manassas, Virginia; Dr. Neville Sender,
clinic administrator; Ms. Marne Greening; Mr. Keith Tucci and Mr. Jay Sekulow of
Operation Rescue; Mr. Michael Bray and Mr. Joseph Scheidler, pro-life advocates;
and Sheriff James T. Hickey of Corpus Christi, Texas. Id.
26. H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 700.
27. Id. As in the 102d Congress's hearings, representatives from both sides of
the issue testified: David Gunn,Jr., son of murdered abortion doctor; Ms.Jeri Ras-
mussen, Executive Director of the Midwest Health Center for Women in Minneap-
olis, Minnesota; Ms. Susan Hill, President of National Women's Health
Organization; Dr. Normal Tompkins, obstetrician and gynecologist at Margot Pe-
rot Center in Dallas, Texas; Mr. Randall Terry, founder of Operation Rescue; Rev.
Joseph Foreman, President of Missionaries to the Preborn; Mr.Jeff White, Director
of Operation Rescue in California; Ms. Ketherine Hudson, Director of American
Women's Association for Rights and Education; Mr. John Cowles, attorney who
represents clinics; and Mr. Walter Weber, counsel for American Center for Law
and Justice. Id. at 702.
28. Id. The minority members at the time of the hearing were Republican
Congressmen: Honorable F.James Sensenbrenner, Jr., CarlosJ. Moorhead, Henry
J. Hyde, Bill McCollum, Howard Coble, Lamar S. Smith, Elton Gallegy, Charles T.
Canady, Bob Inglis and Robert W. Goodlatte. Id. at 713. Witnesses at this second
hearing were primarily pro-life representatives: Most Rev. James T. McHugh,
Bishop of Camden, New Jersey; Rabbi Yehunda Levin, Executive Director of "Get
Free"; Rev. Pat Mahoney, Director of the Christian Defense Coalition and Joshua
Project; Ms. Katie Mahoney, National Spokesperson for Operation Rescue; Mr.
Steven Wood, Director of Family Life Center; and Mr. Victor Eliason, Vice Presi-
dent, WVCY Channel 30 Christian Broadcasting in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Id.
29. S. REP. No. 103-117, at 2 (1993). The Committee on Labor and Human
Resources held its hearing on May 12, 1993. Id. Representatives from both sides
of the debate as well as prominent constitutional scholars attended the hearing:
Ms.Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States; Dr. Pablo Rodriguez, Medi-
cal Director of Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island; Ms. Willa Craig, Executive
Director, Blue Mountain Clinic, Missoula, Montana; Mr. David Lasso, City Man-
ager, Falls Church, Virginia; Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School; Ms. Joan Appelton, Pro-Life Action Ministries; Ms. Carol Crossed; and Mr.
Nicholas Nikas, American Family Association. Id. at 2-3.
5
Scheib: Cheffer v. Reno: Is the Regulation of Abortion Clinic Protests th
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
life activists' violence and its impact on abortion patients and providers.3 0
Moreover, the Senate inquired about the ability of state and local law en-
forcement to handle this problem. 3 1
Following these hearings, the House and Senate approved the legisla-
tion. 32 Congress then forwarded FACE to the White House.3 3 Finally, on
May 26, 1994, President Clinton signed the legislation into law while urg-
ing vigorous enforcement. 34
2. Congressional Findings
Congress made several findings regarding the need for FACE and its
Commerce Clause implications. 35 Congress found that the campaign of
violence represented a coordinated, national and interstate effort beyond
the control of state and local jurisdictions.3 6 In addition, Congress found
30. Id. at 3-17.
31. Id. at 3.
32. H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 699. On March 25, 1993, the House Committee
on theJudiciary's Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice favorably reported
H.R. 796, by a vote of nine "aye" and four "no," to the full Committee. Id. Then,
on September 14, 1993, the House Committee on the Judiciary reported the bill to
the House by a vote of 24 "aye" and 11 "no." Id. Concurrently, the Senate consid-
ered similar legislation and the Committee on Labor and Human Resources favor-
ably reported the bill to the Senate by a vote of 13-4 on June 23, 1993. S. REP. No.
103-117, at 33-35. The Senate approved the bill on April 12, 1994 and the House
also approved the bill on March 17, 1995. H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 699; Kevin
Merida, House Approves Bill to Combat Violence at Abortion Clinics, WASH. POST, Nov.
19, 1993, at All.
33. H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 699. The Senate approved the Conference Re-
port on May 12, 1994; the House did so on May 5, 1994. Id.
34. American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 855 F. Supp. 137, 140 (E.D. Va. 1994)
("On May 26, 1994, President Clinton signed [FACE] into law, stating that he in-
tended it to be vigorously enforced."); Michael Kranish, Ban on Abortion Clinic
Strife Signed, BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 1994, at 3 (quoting President Clinton as say-
ing: "We simply cannot and must not continue to allow the attacks, the incidents of
arson, the campaigns of intimidation upon law-abiding citizens that has given rise
to this law.").
35. H. CONF. REP. No. 103-488, at 1 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.S.C.A.N. 699,
724. Congress enumerated additional findings that were unrelated to the com-
merce question, but were related to other issues surrounding the enactment of
FACE such as the First Amendment issue of free speech. Id. at 725.
36. Id. at 724. In addition, the House Report mentions, numerous times, the
interstate scope of the problem and that state and local law enforcement officials
could not handle the problem. H.R. RE. No. 103-306, at 703 ("[1]ncidents have
occurred all across the nation, large-scale operations have been and are continu-
ing to be organized on an inter-state basis ... a national strategy has emerged,
orchestrated largely by Operation Rescue and its affiliates, that has, as one of its
goals, the goal of forcing doctors and others to stop performing abortions....
Attorney General Janet Reno has testified that 'much of the activity has been
orchestrated by groups functioning on a nationwide scale."') (quoting Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993: Hearings on S. 636 Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong. 9 (1993) (testimony of Janet Reno, Attor-
ney General of the United States)). It concludes that current State and local laws
are inadequate. Id. at 707 ("[E]xisting criminal laws at the state and local level
872 [Vol. 41: p. 867
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that state and local law enforcement authorities could not or would not
stop the violence by enforcing injunctions and local laws, such as criminal
trespass, vandalism and assault. 37 Congress also decided that the violent
conduct infringed upon constitutionally guaranteed rights, in particular
the right to choose, as well as federal and state law.
3 8
Most importantly, Congress found that the national scope of abortion
clinic violence burdened interstate commerce.3 9 Section 2, clause 3 of
FACE states:
have failed to provide the certainty of prosecution, conviction and punishment
necessary to deter these activities on a nationwide scale.").
37. H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 707. House Report 306 notes that: "Enforce-
ment of local laws such as trespass, vandalism and assault have proven inadequate
.. 'the reluctance of local authorities to protect the rights of individuals provides
a powerful justification for the enactment of federal protections that has been
evoked previously by Congress in passing laws to protect civil rights."' Id. (quoting
testimony ofJanet Reno, Attorney General, Hearings on S. 636, supra note 36, at 9).
The House Report also found that current federal laws were inadequate. Id. It
failed, however, to address the use of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO) in prosecuting abortion protesters. Id.; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(e) (1994) (RICO); see also NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994) (hold-
ing that prosecutors could use civil RICO to prosecute abortion protesters); Hil-
ber, supra note 7, at 157 ("Use of civil RICO recently received a great lift with the
United States Supreme Court decision in NOW v. Scheidler."); Carolyn J. Lock-
wood, Regulating the Abortion Clinic Battleground: Will Free Speech Be the Ultimate Casu-
alty, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 995, 1013-17 (1995) (discussing use of RICO against
abortion protestors); Golinski, supra note 11, at 163 (discussing NOW v. Scheidler
and use of RICO against abortion protestors).
Conversely, the minority report notes the effectiveness of local law enforce-
ment and current federal remedies:
What need is there for a federal statute given the abundance of state and
local laws addressing rescue conduct when it becomes illegal . . .
[ciriminal trespass, criminal contempt, disorderly conduct, resisting
arrest, and unlawful assembly are examples of criminal statutes used to
punish some clinic sit-ins or "rescues." Civil remedies, like injunctions,
are often pursued by clinics or their patients.
H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 717 (dissenting views of Honorable F.James Sensenbren-
ner,Jr., CarlosJ. Moorhead, HenryJ. Hyde, Bill McCollum, Howard Coble, Lamar
S. Smith, Elton Galleghy, Charles T. Canady, Bob Inglis and Robert W. Goodlatte).
Specifically, the minority reported that there were 2,700 arrests, prosecutions,
criminal contempt proceedings and jailings for injunction violations in Witchita,
Kansas, 500 arrests in Buffalo, New York and 68 arrests during an abortion clinic
blockade in Manassas, Virginia. Id. at 718. Thus, they concluded that approxi-
mately 70,000 arrests were made in the last five years. Id. at 719. The minority also
contended that no federal court injunction regarding a clinic protest rested on
state or local officials' failure to enforce laws on behalf of abortion patients. Id. at
718 (relying on Bruce Fein, Triumph for Rule of Law, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1993, at
F1). The minority, however, recognized the use of RICO to prosecute violent
abortion clinic protestors. Id. at 719 ("Civil RICO has been used against anti-abor-
tion sit-ins and is now the subject of Supreme Court litigation.").
38. H. CONF. REP. No. 103-488, at 724. The House specifically notes: "[The
campaign of violence] has resulted, as intended, in access to the constitutionally
protected right to choose being denied to thousands of women nationwide against
their will." H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 703.
39. H. CONF. REP. No. 103-488, at 724; S. REP. No. 103-117, at 30-32 (1993).
7
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Such conduct also burdens interstate commerce by forcing pa-
rents to travel from states where their access to reproductive
health services is obstructed to other states, and by interfering
with the interstate commercial activities of health care providers,
including the purchase and lease of facilities and equipment, sale
of goods and services, employment of personnel and generation
of income, and purchase of medicine, medical supplies, surgical
instruments and other supplies from other states.4°
Based upon this rationale, Congress decided that abortion clinic protests
infringed upon interstate commerce. 4 1 Accordingly, Congress enacted
the legislation "to protect and promote the public safety and health and
activities affecting interstate commerce."4 2
3. The Act
FACE provides for both federal criminal penalties and civil reme-
dies.4 3 To prove a violation of FACE, the prosecution or civil plaintiff
must prove three elements. 44 First, they must show that a defendant used
force, threat of force, physical obstruction or intimidation or that the de-
40. H. CONF. REP. No. 103-488, at 724. While the House Report did not spe-
cifically address the Commerce Clause, the Senate Report did. S. REP. No. 103-
117, at 30-32. It concluded that Congress had constitutional authority under the
Commerce Clause to enact FACE. Id. The Senate Report noted that abortion
service providers were involved indirectly and directly in interstate commerce. Id.
at 31. Specifically, it found that clinics "purchase medicine, medical supplies, sur-
gical instruments and other necessary medical products, often from other States;
they employ staff; they own and lease office space; they generate income." Id.
Thus, the Committee decided clinics were within the stream of interstate com-
merce. Id.
41. H. CONF. REP. No. 103-488, at 724.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 248; see also Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1518 (11th Cir.
1995) (addressing statutory purpose).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 248(b)-(c). Federal criminal penalties are available when the
Attorney General or a state attorney general raises the claim. Id. Civil penalties
are available when the individual affected by the violation raises the claim. Id. For
the language of the statute, see infra note 44.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 248; see also United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1427
(C.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing elements of a FACE violation). The text of the statute
is as follows:
Freedom of access to clinic entrances
(a) Prohibited Activities.-Whoever-
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intention-
ally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intim-
idate or interfere with any person because that person is or has been,
or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any
class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health
services;
(2) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intention-
ally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intim-
idate or interefere with any person lawfully exercising or seeking to
exercise the First Amendment right of religious freedom a place of
worship; or
8
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(3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility, or
attempts to do so, because such facility provides reproductive health
services, or intentionally damages or destroys the property of a place
of religious worship, shall be subject to the penalties provided in sub-
section (b) and the civil remedies provided in subsection (c), except
that a parent or legal guardian of a minor shall not be subject to any
penalties or civil remedies under this section for such activities inso-
far as they are directed exclusively at that minor.
(b) Penalties.-Whoever violates this section shall-
(1) in the case of a first offense, be fined in accordance with this
title, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and
(2) in the case of a second or subsequent offense after a prior con-
viction under this section, be fined in accordance with this title, or
imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both; except that for an of-
fense involving exclusively a nonviolent physical obstruction, the fine
shall be not more than $10,000 and the length of imprisonment shall
be not more than six months, or both, for the first offense; and the
fine shall, notwithstanding section 3571, be not more than $25,000
and the length of imprisonment shall be not more than 18 months,
or both, for a subsequent offense; and except that if bodily injury
results, the length of imprisonment shall be not more than 10 years,
and if death results, it shall be for any term of years or for life.
(c) Civil Remedies.-
(1) Right of Action.-
(A) In General.-Any person aggrieved by reason of the con-
duct prohibited by subsection (a) may commence a civil action
for the relief set forth in subparagraph (B), except that such an
action may be brought under subsection (a) (1) only by a person
involved in providing or seeking to provide, or obtaining or seek-
ing to obtain, services in a facility that provides reproductive
health services, and such an action may be brought under sub-
section (a) (2) only by a person lawfully exercising or seeking to
exercise the First Amendment right of religious freedom at a
place of religious worship or by the entity that owns or operates
such a place of religious worship.
(B) Relief.-In any action under subparagraph (A), the court
may award appropriate relief, including temporary, preliminary
or permanent injuctive relief and compensatory and punitive
damages, as well as the costs of suit and reasonable fees for attor-
neys and expert witnesses. With respect to compensatory dam-
ages, the plaintiff may elect, at any time prior to the rendering of
final judgment, to recover, in lieu of actual damages, an award of
statutory damages in the amount of $5,000 per violation.
(2) Action by Attorney General of the United States.-
(A) In General.-If the Attorney General of the United States
has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of per-
sons is being, has been, or may be injured by conduct constitut-
ing a violation of this section, the Attorney General may
commence a civil action in any appropriate United States District
Court.
(B) Relief.-In any action under subparagraph (A), the court
may award appropriate relief, including temporary, preliminary
or permanent injuctive relief, and compensatory damages to per-
sons aggrieved as described in paragraph (1) (B). The court, to
vindicate the public interest, may also assess a civil penalty
against each respondent-
9
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(i) in an amount not exceeding $10,000 for a nonvio-
lent physical obstruction and $15,000 for other first vio-
lations; and
(ii) in an amount not exceeding $15,000 for a nonvio-
lent physical obstruction and $25,000 for any subse-
quent violation.
(3) Actions by State Attorneys General.-
(A) In General.-If the Attorney General of a State has reason-
able cause to believe that any person or group of persons is be-
ing, has been, or may be injured by conduct constituting a
violation of this section, such Attorney General may commence a
civil action in the name of such State, as parens patriae on behalf
of natural persons residing in such State, in any appropriate
United States District Court.
(B) Relief.-In any action under subparagraph (A), the court
may award appropriate relief, including temporary, preliminary
or permanent injuctive relief and compensatory damages, and
civil penalties as described in paragraph (2)(B).
(d) Rules of Construction.-Nothing in this section shall be construed-
(1) to prohibit any expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing
or other peaceful demonstration) protected from legal prohibition
by the First Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) to create new remedies for interference with activities protected
by the free speech or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment to
the Constitution, occurring outside a facility, regardless of the point
of view expressed, or to limit any existing legal remedies for such
interference;
(3) to provide exclusive criminal penalties or civil remedies with re-
spect to the conduct prohibited by this section, or to preempt State
or local laws that may provide such penalties or remedies; or
(4) to interfere with the enforcement of State or local laws regulat-
ing the performance of abortions or other reproductive health
services.
(e) Definitions.-As used in this section:
(1) Facility.-The term "facility" includes a hospital, clinic, physi-
cian's office, or other facility that provides reproductive health serv-
ices, and includes the building or structure in which the facility is
located.
(2) Interfere with.-The term "interfere with" means to restrict a
person's freedom of movement.
(3) Intimidate.-The term "intimidate" means to place a person in
reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to him- or herself or to
another.
(4) Physical Obstruction.-The term "physical obstruction" means
rendering impassable ingress to or egress from a facility that provides
reproductive health services or to or from a place of religious wor-
ship, or rendering passage to or from such a facility or place of reli-
gious worship unreasonably difficult or hazardous.
(5) Reproductive health services.-The term "reproductive health
services" means reproductive health services provided in a hospital,
clinic, physician's office, or other facility, and includes medical, surgi-
cal, counselling or referral services relating to the human reproduc-
tive system, including services relating to pregnancy or the
termination of a pregnancy.
(6) State.-The term "State" includes a State of the United States,
the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or pos-
session of the United States.
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fendant destroyed property.4 5 Second, they must prove that the defend-
ant did so with the intent to injure, intimidate or interefere with a
provider or seeker of abortion services.46 Finally, the statute requires the
complainant to demonstrate that the defendant acted because the victim
provided or sought reproductive health services. 47
B. The Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, Federalism and the Supreme
Court's Jurisprudence: A Ship Blown by the Prevailing Winds
Defendants have challenged FACE on numerous grounds.48 In each
case, the defendants argue that the law is an ultra vires action outside the
scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power. In constitutional chal-
lenges to the powers of Congress, such as these, the court's inquiry must
attack the statute on two tiers. The first tier implicates the extent of the
18 U.S.C. § 248.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (1). For the text of the statute, see supra note 44.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1). For the text of the statute, see supra note 44.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (1). For the text of the statute, see supra note 44.
48. United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir.
1995); Woodall v. Reno, 47 F.3d 656 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995);
American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1994); Hoffman v. Hunt, 923
F. Supp. 791 (W.D.N.C. 1996); United States v. Scott, 919 F. Supp. 76 (D. Conn.
1996); United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Kan. 1995); United States v.
White, 893 F. Supp. 1423 (C.D. Cal. 1995); United States v. Hill, 893 F. Supp. 1034
(N.D. Fla. 1994); Reily v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 708-09 (D. Ariz. 1994); Cook v.
Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008 (W.D. La. 1994); Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856
F. Supp. 1422, 1431 (S.D. Cal. 1994); United States v. Brock, No. 94-CR-86 UPS),
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13666, at *56 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 23, 1994); see generally Lock-
wood, supra note 37, at 1010-11 (outlining various claims that defendants have
used against FACE). While defendants have challenged FACE on Commerce
Clause grounds, they also have challenged the statute on other grounds. Some
defendants claimed that it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment. Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1374-77; Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 920-24; Cheffer, 55 F.3d at
1522; American Life League, 47 F.3d at 648-52; Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 820-22;
Lucero, 895 F. Supp. at 1421; Reily, 860 F. Supp. at 709; Cook, 859 F. Supp. at 1010;
Council for Life Coalition, 856 F. Supp. at 1426-30; Brock, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13666, at *56; see generally Lockwood, supra note 37, at 995 (discussing First
Amendment issue); Michael S. Paulsen & Michael W. McConnell, The Doubtful
Constitutionality of the Clinic Access Bill, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 261, 279-85 (1994)
(same); Jill W. Rose & Chris Osborn, Note, Face-ialneutrality: A Free Speech Challenge
to the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 81 VA. L. REv. 1505, 1521-51 (1995)
(contending that FACE violates First Amendment right to free speech). Defend-
ants also claimed that FACE violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-
2000bb4 (1996). Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1522; American Life League, 47 F.3d at 654-56;
Reily, 860 F. Supp. at 709; Council for Life Coalition, 856 F. Supp. at 1430-31; Brock,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13666, at *56. Additionally, defendants claimed Congress
lacked the power to enact FACE under the Necessary and Proper Clause and that
the statute was unconstitutionally vague. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 652-53;
Reily, 860 F. Supp. at 709; Councilfor Life Coalition, 856 F. Supp. at 1429; Brock, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13666, at *56.
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affirmative constitutional grant of power to Congress. 49 In this case, the
affirmative grant of power is the Commerce Clause.5 0 Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 of the Constitution provides that Congress has the power "to reg-
ulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes."5 1 Conversely, the second tier involves the negative
constraints of the Tenth Amendment that limit congressional authority.
52
The Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the states or the people those
powers not granted to the federal government by the Constitution, creates
a balance of power between state and federal governments. 53
49. The analysis of any congressional enactment must start with the question:
Where does Congress get its power to regulate such activity or to enact such a law?
See Wesley N. Hohfield, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1917) (discussing nature of legal power and noting it to
be one of "lowest common denominators of the law"). According to Judge Bork,
the United States Supreme Court often fails to ask and answer this question.
BoRx, supra note 2, at 74-84, 110-26 (arguing that in cases dealing with desegrega-
tion and abortion, among others, Court failed to base its opinion on Constitution
and looked to social and psychological reasons instead).
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Hearing on State Sovereignty and Role of Fed-
eral Government Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights
of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104 Cong. (1995), available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
CmtRpt File (testimony ofJohn G. Kester) [hereinafter Kester Testimony] (" [T] here
is a built-in tension between the Tenth Amendment and some of the Constitu-
tion's grant of federal authority, particularly the Commerce Clause."); C. HERMAN
PRITCHETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 215 (1984) ("The lan-
guage [of the Commerce Clause], be it noted, is in terms of a positive grant of
power to Congress."). For a further discussion of the history of the Commerce
Clause, see supra notes 48-49 and infra notes 51-121 and accompanying text.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
52. U.S. CONsT. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people."); see United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1346 (5th
Cir. 1993) (noting that Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause "are but two
sides of the same coin"), affid, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995); United States v. Mussari,
894 F. Supp. 1360, 1367 (D. Ariz. 1995) (noting that when Congress does not act
pursuant to one of its constitutionally enumerated powers, it is infringing upon
those powers which are reserved to states by Tenth Amendment); United States v.
Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 633 (E.D. Wis.) (quoting Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1342) (noting
that Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment are two sides of same coin), rev'd,
73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
53. U.S. CONsT. amend. X; see Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (noting
that notion of limited, enumerated federal powers is "made absolute by the Tenth
Amendment"); Kester Testimony, supra note 50 (observing that Tenth Amendment
was meant to ensure that, unlike states, federal government could only legislate
under enumerated powers); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic
Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. Rsv. 1355,
1359 (1994) ("A robust federalism must maintain boundaries between state and
national authority by protecting the states against invasions by national institu-
tions, by protecting the states from incursions by their neighbors, and by re-
straining states from transgression on core national/constitutional values."). But
see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (stating that Tenth Amend-
ment is "but a truism" and has no substantive impact).
The balance of power between the federal government and the states, how-
ever, is continually evolving and depends on the relative significance the courts
[Vol. 41: p. 867
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Over the years, the Supreme Court has grappled with these two tiers
of Commerce Clause analysis. 54 In particular, it has tried to resolve the
inherent conflict between the two. Since 1787, the Supreme Court's Com-
attribute to the constitutional grants of power to the federal government and the
Tenth Amendment. Thus, federalism is dynamic, not static. See Mussari, 894 F.
Supp. at 1360 ("When Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as crimi-
nal by the States, it effects a 'change in the sensitive relation between federal and
state criminal jurisdiction."' (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349
(1971))); see also Joseph Lesser, The Course of Federalism in America-An Historical
Overview, in FEDERALISM: THE SHIFrING BALANCE 1 (Janice C. Griffith ed., 1989)
(providing overview of historical shifts in extent of federalism); Jeff Powell, Com-
ment, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317
(1982) (discussing emergence of Justice Rehnquist's theory of federalism and its
historical basis).
54. Kester Testimony, supra note 50 (discussing evolution from time when every
congressional action was challenged as infringement on powers of states to post-
New Deal era when extent of federal legislation greatly expanded, leaving states
little authority). The nature and content of the limitations on federal power have
bewildered the Supreme Court. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985) (observing that federal structure's imposition of limits on
Commerce Clause is not problematic, but nature and content of those limitations
is).
An often-quoted Supreme Court statement dismisses the Tenth Amendment,
concluding that the Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has
not been surrendered." Darby, 312 U.S. at 124; see David M. Burke, The "Presump-
tion of Constitutionality" Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court: A Lethal Combination for
Individual Liberty, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73, 106 (1994) ("To the dismay of
many, not the least of whom would surely be the Framers, the Tenth Amendment,
as well as the principle underlying it, has with rare exception been rendered a
dead letter."). In Garcia, the Supreme Court ignored the Tenth Amendment in
holding that political procedural safeguards, rather than judicial limitations, best
protect state sovereignty. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528. This decision expressly over-
turned a Court decision that interpreted the Tenth Amendment as an "affirmative
limitation" on Congress "akin to" others in the Bill of Rights. National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528. Thus,
the balance of power shifted in favor of the federal government, especially in Com-
merce Clause cases. See generally Kester Testimony, supra note 50 (noting that "[a]s
for the Tenth Amendment, once the grant of power to Congress in Article I, [Sec-
tion] 8, was interpreted to be virtually limitless, the requirement that Congress had
to stay within that grant lost any practical significance").
Nevertheless, in some recent cases, the Supreme Court may have constructed
a legal framework to reinvigorate the Tenth Amendment and the principles of
federalism. Richard C. Reuben, Court Bolsters 1Oth Amendment, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1995,
at 78 ("While today's renewed focus on federalism is being driven by political
events, much of the legal groundwork already has been plowed by the U.S.
Supreme Court."). For example, the Rehnquist Court breathed new life into the
balance of power issue. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992)
(holding that federal government requirement that states "take title" to radioactive
waste lies outside Congress's enumerated powers and is inconsistent with "the Con-
stitution's division of authority between the federal and state governments"); Greg-
ory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (refusing to strike down mandatory
retirement system for judges in Missouri after it was challenged under Age Dis-
crimination and Employment Act); see also Kester Testimony, supra note 50 (noting
that Court has treated Tenth Amendment as seperate limitation on federal power
in some instances); Reuben, supra, at 79 (using Gregory as illustration of Court's
"reaffirmation of federalism principles").
1996] NOTE
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merce Clause analysis has reflected this debate and been a ship blown
across the waters by the prevailing political winds.5 5 Nevertheless, for
years the Court's attempts to meld an intelligible rule for applying the
Commerce Clause were divisible into three time frames: an age of plenary
power, an age of restraint and the modern age. 56 The Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Lopez,5 7 however, represents the dawn of a
fourth age in Commerce Clause interpretation.
1. Age of Plenaty Power: Gibbons v. Ogden
Beginning with Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court
broadly interpreted Congress's power to regulate under the Commerce
Clause.5 8 In Gibbons v. Ogden,59 the Court defined the constitutional term
"among" as "concern[ing] more states than one"; thus, it distinguished
interstate commerce from intrastate commerce.60 The Court then ruled
55. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 53, at 1359. Eskridge and Ferejohn
noted that "because the Court is politically vulnerable to Congress and the Presi-
dent, it has rarely attempted to construe the Commerce Clause to limit congres-
sional authority." Id. In fact, the early Court gave Congress broad authority to
regulate commerce. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). From the
1880s until 1937, however, the Court more frequently restrained Congress. See
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1 (1895). Since then, the Court has validated nearly every congressional act
under the Commerce Clause. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964);
Heart of Atlanta, Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Darby, 312 U.S. at 100; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See generally 1 DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW AND POLITICS: STRUGGLES FOR POWER AND GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY
447-522 (1991) (discussing generally evolution of Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv.
1387 (1987) (outlining history of Commerce Clause litigation and discussing
Supreme Court's rulings). For a further discussion of this evolution, see infra
notes 58-121 and accompanying text.
56. For a further discussion of the history of the age of plenary power, see
infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the age of
restraint, see infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of
the modern age, see infra notes 77-107 and accompanying text.
57. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). For a further discussion of Lopez, see infra notes
108-21 and accompanying text.
58. SeeJOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 142 (4th ed. 1991) ("Mar-
shall's... position had been one of great deference to the Congress and of active
promotion of national power."); O'BRIEN, supra note 55, at 451 ("Marshall further
advanced his vision of national governmental power by broadly coristruing the
Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden."). This extension of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause is consistent with Marshall's Federalist background
and his corresponding desire for a strong national government. See, e.g., McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (interpreting Constitution as
granting expansive powers to Congress by upholding constitutionality of national
bank).
59. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
60. Id. at 194. Gibbons created a distinction between powers given to Congress
and those reserved to the states. Id. at 195 ("The completely internal commerce of
a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself."); see O'BRIEN,
[Vol. 41: p. 867
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that Congress could regulate interstate commerce but not intrastate com-
merce. 6 1 The Court also held that Congress's power to regulate, where it
existed, was plenary.62 Subsequently, the Court used its definition of in-
terstate commerce and the plenary power of Congress to uphold several
congressional actions and federal regulations under the Commerce
Clause.63
supra note 55, at 476 (citing Gibbons as creating distinction between Congress's
power over interstate commerce and states' power over intrastate commerce);
PRJTCHETr, supra note 50, at 218 (noting that Marshall, in Gibbons, laid basis for
splitting commerce into two parts). Then, under Chief Justice Taney, the Court
specifically defined an interstate-intrastate distinction. The License Cases, 46 U.S.
(5 How.) 504 (1847); see O'BRIEN, supra note 55, at 476 (noting that Taney Court
based interstate-intrastate distinction on Marshall Court dicta). Relying on dicta
from the Gibbons opinion, the Court created two mutually exclusive commerce
powers in The License Cases. 46 U.S. at 504. The first was intrastate commerce:
"internal or domestic commerce, which belongs to the States, and over which Con-
gress can exercise no control." Id. at 575; see also The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 283, 400 (1849) (stating "[a]ll commercial action within the limits of a
State, and which does not extend to any other State or foreign country, is exclu-
sively under State regulation"). The second was interstate commerce, commerce
between two or more states, over which Congress had exclusive control. The Li-
cense Cases, 46 U.S. at 578.
61. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1.
62. Id. at 197. In another important case, Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321
(1903), the Court further defined the term "regulate." Id. at 354-62. In Champion,
the defendant challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute that prohibited
the shipment of lottery tickets. Id. at 344. The Court concluded that prohibition
was a necessary aspect of regulation and, therefore, encompassed within the mean-
ing of the term. Id. While the Court also recognized that the Constitution was the
only restraint on congressional power, it held that the Tenth Amendment did not
limit Congress's power to regulate health, safety and morals. Id. at 357. Thus, the
Court held that the federal government may supplement the states' authority
under their police power through regulation. Id.; see generally PRITCHETT, supra
note 50, at 222 (noting that Champion v. Ames created national police power).
63. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) (upholding fed-
eral license requirements for ships operating interstate if goods they carried were
destined for another state). There were only a few challenges to Congress's com-
merce power during this period because Congress rarely asserted this power until
after the Civil War. See generally O'BRIEN, supra note 55, at 476 (noting that Con-
gress did not assert its commerce power until after Civil War); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw § 5-4, at 306 (2d ed. 1988) ("Until Congress en-
acted the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890,
Commerce Clause litigation rarely involved the Supreme Court in the review of
congressional action."). By the end of the Civil War, the interstate-intrastate dis-
tinction was very formalistic with the determination hinging upon whether com-
merce crossed a state line. See O'BRIEN, supra note 55, at 476 (noting that Court
applied interstate-intrastate distinction in formalistic way by late 1800s).
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2. Age of Restraint: Limiting Congressional Power Under the
Production-Distribution Distinction
The reshaping of the Supreme Court in the late 1880s produced a
new line of Commerce Clause decisions.64 While the Court continued to
rely on Gibbons's interstate-intrastate dichotomy, it also created a new dis-
tinction: the production-distribution distinction.65 In so doing, the Court
was able to invalidate federal regulation, thereby limiting congressional
power over commerce. 66
The Court created the production-distribution rule in United States v.
E.C. Knight Co.67 In Knight, the Court held that the Sherman Antitrust Act
did not apply to a sugar company because the company's production of
sugar did not relate to commerce between the states.68 The Court based
64. Rachel J. Littman, Gun-Free Schools: Constitutional Powers, Limitations, and
Social Policy Concerns Surrounding Federal Regulation of Firearms in School, 5 SETON
HaL CONsT. L.J. 723, 745 (1995). Littman notes that the Court has not always
interpreted the Commerce Clause to give Congress broad regulatory powers. Id.
She comments that "during the late Nineteenth Century and until the late 1930s,
the Court rountinely struck down federal laws that sought to regulate areas of local
economic or state concern." Id.
After the Civil War, the composition of the Court drastically changed with
economic conservatives, such as Chief Justice Melville Fuller and Justices Stephen
Field and Samuel Miller, leading the charge. O'BRIEN, supra note 55, at 477. Join-
ing them were other Justices, such as Justices David Brewer, Edward White and
Rufus Peckham, who opposed social change and supported laissez-faire capitalism.
Id. Their philosophies and ideologies contributed to this new line of Commerce
Clause cases. Id.
65. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); United States v. E.C. Knight
Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
66. See O'BRIEN, supra note 55, at 477 ("[The] production/distribution rule ena-
bled the Court . . . to . . . strike down federal regulations and thereby limit the
reach of congressional power over commerce."). For a further discussion of the
production-distribution distinction, see infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
67. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). The Court began to create this distinction in Kidd v.
Pearson. 128 U.S. 1 (1888). In that case, the Court defined manufacturing as "the
fashioning of raw materials into a change of form for use" and commerce distribu-
tion as "[t]he buying and selling and the transportation incidental thereto." Id. at
20.
68. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16-17. The United States brought the claim against the
American Sugar Refining Company under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id. at 9.
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 to "protect trade and com-
merce against unlawful restraints and monopolies." Id. at 6. Through the
purchase of stock, the company acquired an interest in a large majority of refined
sugar manufacturers. Id. at 9. Thus, it "acquired nearly complete control of the
manufacture of refined sugar within the United States," thereby establishing a
practical monopoly. Id. The United States averred that in acquiring the stock of
other sugar companies, American Sugar Refining intended to restrain the sale of
refined sugar and increase the market price. Id. at 4. The Court ruled in favor of
the company saying, "[w]hat the law struck at was combinations, contracts, and
conspiracies to monopolize trade and commerce among the several States ... but
the contracts and acts of the defendants related exclusively to the acquisition of
the Philadelphia refineries and the business of sugar refining in Pennsylvania, and
bore no direct relation to commerce between the States or with foreign nations."
Id. at 17.
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its decision on the assumption that two spheres of commerce power ex-
isted.69 Specifically, it held that the Constitution grants the regulation of
manufacturing to the states and the regulation of distribution to
Congress. 7
0
Following Knight, Hammer v. Dagenhart7 1 was the most noticeable at-
tempt to restrain Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. 72 In
that case, the Court held that a child-labor law in effect regulated the man-
ufacture of goods and services. 73 Thus, the Court ruled that the child-
69. Id. at 11-12. The Court noted that "[cjommerce succeeds to manufac-
ture, and is not a part of it." Id. at 12. Whereas manufacture is the transformation
of supplies into products, commerce is the buying and selling. Id. at 14. Thus, the
Court concluded that the two were seperate. Id.
70. Id. at 11. Specifically, the Court stated:
It cannot be denied that the power of a State to protect the lives, health,
and property of its citizens, and to preserve good order and the public
morals, "the power to govern men and things within the limits of its do-
minion," is a power originally and always belonging to the States, not sur-
rendered by them to the general government, nor directly restrained by
the Constitution of the United States, and essentially exclusive.... On
the other hand, the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the
several States is also exclusive.
Id. The Court provided guidance by defining manufacturing and distribution. Id.
at 14. The Court defined manufacture as "transformation-the fashioning of raw
materials into a change of form for use." Id. Meanwhile, it defined commerce in
the distribution sense as "[t]he buying and selling and the transportation inciden-
tal thereto." Id. Applying this distinction, the Court concluded that the acts of
acquiring the Philadelphia sugar refineries were wholly internal to Pennsylvania
because it dealt exclusively with manufacturing processes. Id. at 17. Moreover, the
Court placed the regulation of monopolies in the category of regulating manufac-
ture, not in the category of regulating traffic. Id. Therefore, the Sherman Anti-
trust Act "bore no direct relation to commerce between the States or with foreign
nations." Id. See generally TIBE, supra note 63, § 5-4, at 308 (discussing manufac-
turing-distribution distinction).
The Court further utilized this production-distribution distinction to limit
Congress's power over mining, United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S.
344 (1922); fishing, farming and oil production, Champlin Refining Co. v. Cop.
Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932); and hydroelectric power, Utah Power and Light Co. v.
Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932). See O'BIEN, supra note 55, at 478 (observing that
Court, beginning with Knight, used production-distribution distinction to defeat
congressional power under Commerce Clause).
71. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
72. Id. In Hammer, a father filed suit to enjoin the enforcement of a child-
labor law that prohibited the shipment of goods in interstate commerce within
thirty days of employing certain categories of children. Id. at 268-69. The law pro-
hibited the employment of children under age 14 and it prohibited children age
14 to 16 from working more than either the prescribed number of hours per day,
days per week or before six o'clock AM or past seven o'clock PM. Id. at 269.
73. Id. at 272. The Court meant that the law practically regulated manufac-
ture because it forced companies to change their workforce practices in order to
have access to the stream of commerce for shipment. Id. Furthermore, the Court
held that the law was not within the Commerce Clause because the mere intent to
ship the products or services did not constitute commerce. As the Court noted:
[Wlhen the commerce begins is determined, not by the character of the
commodity, nor by the intention of the owner to transfer it to another
17
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labor act was unconstitutional because it sanctioned "an invasion by the
federal power ... [over] a matter purely local in its character, and over
which no authority has been delegated to Congress."
74
Based on these precedents, the Court generally restrained congres-
sional action under the Commerce Clause. While the Court occasionally
upheld a congressional act by creating special, narrow rules, the use of
these rules was rare. 75 As a general matter, the Court continued to con-
state for sale, nor by his preparation of it for transportation, but by its
actual delivery to a common carrier for transportation, or the actual com-
mencement of its transfer to another state .... If it were otherwise, all
manufacture intended for interstate shipment would be brought under
federal control to the practical exclusion of the authority of the States, a
result certainly not contemplated by the framers of the Constitution
when they vested in Congress the authority to regulate commerce among
the States.
Id. at 272-73.
74. Id. at 276.
75. See TRIBE, supra note 63, § 5-4, at 308 ("Despite the narrow formalism of
its doctrine, the Supreme Court of this era occasionally ratified important congres-
sional exercises of the commerce power."). To uphold a congressional act, how-
ever, the Court created a special rule-the "effect on commerce rule." See
O'BREN, supra note 55, at 478 (noting that when Court upheld legislation, it de-
rived formal rules from interstate-intrastate distinction); see, e.g., Schechter Poul-
try Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down slaughterhouse's
conviction under National Industrial Recovery Act because its activity only indi-
rectly affected interstate commerce); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 496 (1922)
(using stream of commerce test to sustain federal regulation of stockyards); Hous-
ton & Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1914) (holding federal gov-
ernment could regulate train rates for trains operating wholly intrastate);
Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (holding federal government
could regulate safety of rail cars used by interstate rail companies even though cars
in question were operated wholly intrastate); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S.
375, 376 (1905) (holding that federal government could regulate stockyards be-
cause they were acting in stream of commerce). Under this rule, Congress could
only regulate activity within a state if it had "an obvious effect or impact on inter-
state commerce." O'BRIEN, supra note 55, at 478 ("[T]he Court rationalized fed-
eral regulation on an 'effect on commerce' rule."); see PRITCHETr, supra note 50, at
225 (noting that under "effect upon commerce" concept, Congress could regulate
activities which affected interstate commerce). In order to implement this rule,
the Court devised four tests for measuring the effect of these local activities on
interstate commerce: the stream of commerce test, the intermingling test, the
Shreveport Doctrine and the direct-indirect distinction. O'BRIEN, supra note 55, at
479-80.
(1) Stream of Commerce-In Swift & Company v. United States, members of
the cattle industry were charged with violating the Sherman Antitrust Act for "con-
spiring with one another, the railroads and others, to monopolize the supply and
distribution of fresh meats throughout the United States." Swift & Company, 196
U.S. at 375. The Court noted that commerce is not technically defined but practi-
cally defined. Id. at 398. Thus, when the course of business is continually recur-
ring, it creates a stream of commerce. Id. at 398-99. In this case, the sale of cattle
at market was only a temporary stop in the stream of commerce that originated in
the grazing fields and terminated at the slaughter house. Id. Thus, the Court
upheld the Act because the cattle producers' purpose was to monopolize the inter-
state commerce of cattle by controlling parts of the stream of commerce. Id. at
397; see also Stafford, 258 U.S. at 495 (using stream of commerce test to sustain
884 [Vol. 41: p. 867
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federal regulation of stockyards); see generally PR1TCHETT, supra note 50, at 226 (dis-
cussing "stream of commerce" rule).
(2) Intermingling-In Southern Ry. v. United States, the Supreme Court af-
firmed Congress's power to regulate, under the Safety Appliance Acts of Congress,
rail cars used by interstate rail companies even though the cars in question were
only used for intrastate transportation. Southern Ry., 222 U.S. at 26-27. The fact
that the cars were not traveling among the states was without significance. Id. at
25. The Court reasoned that the words in the statute, "on any railroad engaged,"
were intended to "embrace all locomotives, cars and similar vehicles used on any
railroad which is a highway of interstate commerce." Id. at 25-26. Next, the Court
defined the intermingling test:
Is there a real or substantial relation or connection between what is re-
quired by these acts in respect of vehicles used in moving intrastate traffic
and the object which the acts obviously are designed to attain, namely,
the safety of interstate commerce and of those who are employed in its
movement?
Id. at 26. Thus, the Court held that the dangers from the simultaneous use of the
railroad by both interstate and intrastate cars, the interchangeability of interstate
and intrastate cars, the interchangeability of rail workers and the interdepen-
dence, rather than independence, of multiple trains on the same railroad created
a substantial connection to interstate commerce. Id. at 27. See generally PRrrCHETr,
supra note 50, at 225-26 (discussing intermingling).
(3) Shreveport Doctrine-In Houston & Tex. Ry. v. United States, the railway
appealed a ruling by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) that required
the railroad to "equalize the terms and conditions upon which they will extend
transportation to traffic of a similar character moving into Texas from Shreveport
with that moving wholly within Texas." Houston & Tex. Ry., 234 U.S. at 348-49. At
the time of the ICC's ruling, the railway was charging significantly more for trans-
port from Shreveport to Texas cities than it was for transport under similar circum-
stances and over similar distances wholly within Texas. Id. at 346. The railway
challenged the validity of this order on the grounds that Congress could not regu-
late their intrastate charges even if necessary to prevent discrimination against in-
terstate traffic. Id. at 350. The Supreme Court, however, decided that the
authority of Congress:
[E]xtending to these interstate carriers as instruments of interstate com-
merce, necessarily embraces the right to control their operations in all
matters having such close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that
the control is essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the
efficiency of the interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions
under which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms and
without molestation or hindrance.
Id. at 351 (emphasis added). In expressing its rationale, the Court created what
came to be known as the Shreveport Doctrine. See generally PR1TCHETT, supra note
50, at 226 (discussing the Shreveport Doctrine).
(4) Direct-Indirect distinction-The Court had already begun to create the
direct and indirect effects doctrine in United States v. E.C. Knight Co. 156 U.S. 1
(1895) (holding that federal government could not, under Sherman Antitrust Act,
forbid merger of sugar companies solely because trade or commerce might be
indirectly affected); see also O'BRIEN, supra note 55, at 480 (discussing beginning of
direct-indirect distinction in Knight). The distinction, however, clearly emerged in
the "Sick Chicken" case, Schechter. 295 U.S. at 495. In Schechter, New York slaugh-
terhouses received chickens from outside the state, slaughtered them and sold
them in local stores. Id. at 520. The Court found that the slaughterhouses were
involved in intrastate commerce that had only an indirect effect on interstate com-
merce. Id. at 546-49. Because the activity did not have a direct impact on inter-
state commerce, the Court overturned the convictions under the National
Industrial Recovery Act. Id. at 551.
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strue the Commerce Clause narrowly and invalidated much of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal legislation, thereby creating the "New
Deal Crisis."76
3. The Modem Age: A Return to Gibbons
In the 1930s, a reversal occurred in the Supreme Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. 77 Initially, the Court remained true to its prior de-
cisions and continued to invalidate many of President Roosevelt's New
Later, the Court better defined direct and indirect effects on commerce in
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307 (1936). In that case, the Court said:
The word "direct" implies that the activity or condition invoked or
blamed shall operate proximately-not mediately, remotely, or collater-
ally-to produce the effect. It connotes the absence of an efficient inter-
vening agency or condition. And the extent of the effect bears no logical
relation to its character. The distinction between a direct and an indirect
effect turns, not upon the magnitude of either the cause or the effect, but
entirely upon the manner in which the effect has been brought about.
Id. The Court formalisticly applied this distinction outlined in Schechter and Carter
Coal. See O'BlUEN, supra note 55, at 481 (noting that rigid use of direct-indirect
distinction drew sharp dissent from some members of Court). See generally PRITCH-
ETT, supra note 50, at 227-30 (discussing direct-indirect distinction)
76. See, e.g., Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 238 (striking down Bituminous Coal Con-
servation Act of 1935); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating
scheme for subsidies under Agricultural Adjustment Act); Schechter, 295 U.S. at 495
(striking down National Recovery Act); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295
U.S. 330 (1935) (striking down railroad retirement program); Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating provisions of National Industrial Recovery
Act); see also O'BRIEN, supra note 55, at 480 (noting Court's striking down of Presi-
dent Roosevelt's program for economic recovery precipitated crisis over New
Deal).
77. See O'BRIEN, supra note 55, at 493-94 (discussing evolution of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence during New Deal); Epstein, supra note 55, at 1443-54 (dis-
cussing New Deal transformation of Commerce Clause).
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Deal programs. 78 In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 79 however, the
Supreme Court reversed direction and initiated the modern expansion of
the Commerce Clause.
80
78. See, e.g., Carter Coal 298 U.S. at 238 (striking down Bituminous Coal Con-
servation Act of 1935); Butler, 297 U.S. at 1 (invalidating scheme for subsidies
under Agricultural Adjustment Act); Schechter, 295 U.S. at 495 (striking down Na-
tional Recovery Act); Alton R.R., 295 U.S. at 330 (striking down railroad retirement
program); Panama Ref, 293 U.S. at 388 (invalidating provisions of National Indus-
trial Recovery Act). President Roosevelt consequently sent a plan to Congress to
expand the number of Justices on the Court to twelve. See BORK, supra note 2, at
54-56 (discussing Roosevelt's Court-packing plan and its developments); O'BRIEN,
supra note 55, at 481 (remarking that Court's striking down important New Deal
legislation embittered President Roosevelt and that he responded by proposing to
expand size of Court in order to get majority of Court sympathetic to his pro-
grams); David 0. Stewart, Back to the Commerce Clause, A.BA. J., July 1995, at 48
("Decisions like Schechter Poulty were a major cause of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's re-election landslide in 1936, as he campaigned against the 'Nine Old
Men' who had struck down New Deal programs .... The election results en-
couraged him to pursue his 'Court-packing' plan of 1937."); see also President
Roosevelt's Radio Broadcast, Mar. 9, 1937 (announcing his Court-packing plan),
reprinted in O'BRIEN, supra note 55, at 63. The decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), saved the nine Justice Court. See TRIBE, supra note 63,
at 308-09 ("[W]ith its watershed decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
the Court acceded to political pressure."); Epstein, supra note 55, at 1443 ("[T]he
1936 Roosevelt mandate and the prospect of court packing could hardly have been
lost on the Court.").
79. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
80. Id. Actually, there were three cases that came down from the Supreme
Court within days of one another. NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co.,
301 U.S. 58 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); Jones &
Laughlin Steel 301 U.S. at 1. Jones & Laughlin Steel; however, is recognized as the
major case that ended the New Deal crisis. See Epstein, supra note 55, at 1443
(citingJones & Laughlin Steel as first major case to challenge traditional Commerce
Clause analysis).
The Court's newly found support for Roosevelt's initiatives arose when Chief
Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts switched their positions on New Deal legisla-
tion. O'BRIEN, supra note 55, at 493. Justices Hughes and Roberts's switch became
known as the "switch in time that saved nine." See id. (explaining that by uphold-
ing New Deal legislation, Justices Hughes and Roberts convinced Congress not to
enact Roosevelt's Court-packing plan). Scholars have concluded that political con-
siderations motivated the Justices' vote switch. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JuS-
TICES AND PRESIDENTS 211 (3d ed. 1992) ("No matter how insistently Hughes and
Roberts would later deny that their switch to the liberal wing had been politically
motivated, few students of the Court view their move as anything but a recognition
of, and inevitable bowing to, the handwriting on the wall."); 7 ROBERT MAYER, THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE COURT AND THE AMERICAN CRISES 1930-
1952, at 228 (1987) (arguing that Justice Roberts's newly found support for
Roosevelt's legislative programs resulted from his sensitivity to 1936 election, labor
unrest of time and Roosevelt's Court-packing plan). Fellow Justice Felix Frank-
furter, however, argued that Roberts's switch was not at all politically motivated,
but rather that he was true to his political philosophy and that Roberts silenced his
desire to overturn Adkins v. Children's Hospital 261 U.S. 525 (1923), in Morehead v.
New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), because "a majority could not be had
for overruling." Felix Frankfurter, Mr. justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. Rlv. 311, 311-17
(1955).
1996] NOTE
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The Jones & Laughlin Steel case arose when the Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corporation challenged the National Labor Relations Act ("The Wagner
Act") on the grounds that it was a regulation of labor relations and not
commerce;8 1 The Court held, however, that the National Labor Relations
Board had jurisdiction over any person engaging in unfair labor practices
"affecting commerce.18 2 It ruled that "[t]he close and intimate effect
which brings the subject within the reach of federal power may be due to
activities in relation to productive industry although the industry when
separately viewed is local."8 3 Thus, the Court held that the steel industry's
"ramifying activities" that affected interstate commerce "at every point" il-
lustrated the close and intimate relation that a manufacturing industry
may have with interstate commerce. 84 Consequently, the Court simultane-
ously upheld The Wagner Act, began marching back down the path to-
wards Gibbons and produced the broadly interpreted Commerce Clause of
the modern age.
85
In the years that followed Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Supreme Court
continued to expand the scope of congressional power under the modem
Commerce Clause interpretation while further refining the "affecting
commerce" test.8 6 In United States v. Darby,8 7 for example, the Court ex-
pressly overturned Hammer and held that if an activity "is so related to the
81. Jones & Laughlin Stee4 301 U.S. at 25. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., a
steel producer, discharged ten employees for their union activity in order to dis-
courage their membership in the union. Id. at 29. The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) ordered the company to reinstate these workers. Id. See generally
PRITCHET-r, supra note 50, at 231 (discussing facts surrounding Jones & Laughlin
Steel).
82. Jones &Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 31. The Court noted that the Act specif-
ically defined what activities "affected commerce." Id.
83. Id. at 38. The company contended that the employees were engaged in
local production. Id. at 34. Therefore, they argued that the government could not
regulate production under the production-distribution distinction. Id. The Court
disagreed. Id. at 38-41. For a further explanation of the production-distribution
distinction, see supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
84. Jones & Laughlin Stee4 301 U.S. at 32.
85. See O'BlUEN, supra note 55, at 493-94 (remarking that Jones & Laughlin
Steel reaffirmed Congress's plenary power under Commerce Clause and signaled
return to Gibbons); TRIBE, supra note 63, § 5-4, at 309 (noting thatJones &Laughlin
Steel signaled "return to Chief Justice Marshall's original empiricism"). The effect
of the Jones & Laughlin Steel decision was the advent of the modern, broad regula-
tory powers of Congress. See Epstein, supra note 55, at 1443 ("The old barriers
were stripped away; in their place has emerged the vast and unwarranted concen-
tration of power in Congress that remains the hallmark of the modern regulatory
state."); Robert L. Stern, Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due Process, 4 VAND. L.
RE~v. 446, 468 (1951) ("It may be true that the application of the principles now
approved by the Supreme Court may leave only minor aspects of our economy free
from the regulatory power of Congress."). For a further discussion of cases illus-
trating the extent of the modern Commerce Clause and of Congress's plenary
power to regulate under it, see infra notes 87-107 and accompanying text.
86. See O'BREN, supra note 55, at 494 (observing that after New Deal crisis,
Court legitimated steady expansion of congressional power).
87. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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commerce and so affects [commerce]," it is within the realm of congres-
sional power to regulate.8 8 Moreover, the Court ruled that because Con-
gress's power is plenary, the judiciary has extremely limited power to
question congressional motive or the purpose of a regulation.8 9
Then, in Wickard v. Filburn,90 the Court redefined the test used in
Darby.91 The Court held that "even if [the] activity be local and though it
may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce."9 2 In applying this test, the Court found that while a farmer's
personal consumption of wheat in excess of government mandated quotas
may be small in quantity, the cumulative effect of many farmers personally
consuming wheat affects the market price.93 Thus, the Court held that
Congress may not only regulate acts that individually affect interstate com-
merce, but also those acts that cumulatively affect interstate commerce.9 4
88. Id. at 115-19. The government charged the company with a violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 111. The company manufactured finished
lumber with the intent to ship in interstate commerce. Id. at 109. The company's
actions violated the Fair Labor Standards Act that prohibits interstate shipment of
goods produced by employees whose wages and hours do not conform to the Act's
specifications. Id. The Court decided that Hammer was an inconsistent deviation
from the conclusion that Congress's power under the Commerce Clause is ple-
nary. Id. at 116. Thus, the Court held that:
The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart, was a departure
from the principles which have prevailed in the interpretation of the
Commerce Clause both before and since the decision and that such vital-
ity, as a precedent, as it then had has long since been exhausted. It
should be and now is overruled.
Id. at 116-17.
89. Id. at 115.
90. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
91. Id.; see Darby, 312 U.S. at 100 (defining "affecting commerce" test).. In
Wickard, the Court heard a challenge to the constitutionality of the Agriculture
Adjustment Act of 1938 that regulated and set quotas for wheat production, in-
cluding production that was wholly for the farmer's consumption. Wickard, 317
U.S. at 113-17. Filburn sought to enjoin Secretary of Agriculture Wickard's en-
forcement of the Act. Id. at 113. The defendant charged that personal consump-
tion of wheat was local in character, and its effect on commerce was "indirect." Id.
at 119. Therefore, such regulation, he claimed, was beyond the scope of the Com-
merce Clause. Id.
92. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125. The Court specifically abandoned the direct-
indirect and production-distribution doctrines on which it had relied in the past.
Id. Noting that the production-distribution distinction was based on dicta, the
Court held that: "Whether the subject of the regulation in question was 'produc-
tion,' 'consumption,' or 'marketing' is, therefore, not material for purposes of de-
ciding the question of federal power before us." Id. at 124.
93. Id. at 119.
94. Id. For a further discussion of the "cumulative effect" doctrine see TRIBE,
supra note 63, § 5-5, at 310-11. Commentators feared and discussed a holding that
extended as far as that of Wickard prior to the actual ruling:
If a man plants a patch of potatoes in his back yard, he may feel reason-
ably assured that he is engaged in a purely local enterprise. Yet the more
food that is produced locally, the less will be brought into and more sent
out of the state. The patch of potatoes has an influence-slight, it is
1996] NOTE
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In the 1960s, the Court continuously rejected Commerce Clause chal-
lenges to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and simultaneously expanded con-
gressional regulatory power.95 In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States9 6 and Katzenbach v. McClung,97 the Court concluded that Congress
could regulate the intrastate activity of hotel and restaurant management
if the activity had a "substantial and harmful effect" on interstate com-
merce. 98 Moreover, the Court held that courts should defer to Congress
when the legislature has a rational basis for finding that the regulated ac-
tivity affects interstate commerce. 99 After reviewing the congressional
true-on the movement of food supplies. If every activity which bears any
discernible relation to interstate commerce is subject to federal control,
the commerce power has become all-embracing. Congress could require
a federal license for the planting of a patch of potatoes.
D.G. RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMMERCE 148 (1937); see also
Steven Breker-Cooper, The Commerce Clause: The Case for Judicial Non-Intervention, 69
OR. L. REV. 895, 900 n.22 (1990) (discussing extent of holding in Wickard and how
Ribble's prophecy came to pass in that case).
95. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
a hotel challenged a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that made it illegal
for hotels to discriminate against blacks. 379 U.S. at 243-45. The parties stipulated
that the hotel had 216 rooms, was accessible to interstate highways, advertised on
billboards and that 75% of its guests were from out of state. Id. at 243.
In a companion case, Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court looked at the section
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 regarding restaurants. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294.
McClung owned Ollie's Barbeque in Birmingham, Alabama, which had an almost
exclusively local clientele. Id. at 296. Forty-six percent of its meat, however, was
procured from outside the state. Id.
The hotel and restaurant claimed that the Civil Rights Act was unconstitu-
tional because Congress exceeded its commerce power. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S.
at 243-44. The government, however, contended that Congress has the power
under the Commerce Clause to remove restraints and obstructions from interstate
commerce. Id. at 244.
96. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
97. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
98. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 304; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258. In addition,
the Court found it particularly noteworthy that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 defined
what types of restaurant operations affected interstate commerce. Katzenbach, 379
U.S. at 304. In effect, Congress prohibited discrimination only in those'establish-
ments having a close tie to interstate commerce and, thus, it effectively allowed for
a case-by-case analysis to determine if the actions in question truly affected inter-
state commerce. Id. As the Court noted in Katzenbach: "Congress acted well
within its power to protect and foster commerce in extending the coverage of Title
II [of the Civil Rights Act] only to those restaurants offering to serve interstate
travelers or serving food, a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate
commerce." Id.
99. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258; see also
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (hold-
ing that courts must defer to congressional findings that "a regulated activity af-
fects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such finding"). In Heart
of Atlanta, the Court held that the question was "whether Congress had a rational
basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce." Heart of
Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258. Similarly, the Katzenbach Court ruled that "[w]here we
find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a
[Vol. 41: p. 867
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findings, the Court'concluded that Congress had a rational basis for find-
ing that racial discrimination in a local hotel or restaurant affected inter-
state commerce.100 Finally, the Court added a second prong to the
Commerce Clause analysis by holding that "the [regulatory] means chosen
by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the
Constitution."'10 1 Because the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was "reasonably
adapted" to eliminate the harm of discrimination to interstate commerce,
the Court refused to conduct any further inquiry into other means that
Congress could have chosen.10 2
Following these cases, the scope of the Commerce Clause appeared
clear. First, Congress had plenary power to regulate commerce. 10 3 Sec-
ond, courts had a duty to determine whether the regulated activity af-
fected interstate commerce. 104  Third, courts would then consider
whether Congress had a rational basis for enacting the regulation.10 5 Fi-
nally, courts would determine whether the means were "reasonably
rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection
of commerce, our investigation is at an end." Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04.
In contrast, Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Hodel argues against such deference
to Congress: "[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so." Hodel,
452 U.S. at 311 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 304; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 262. Congress
found that racial discrimination both qualitatively and quantitatively affected inter-
state commerce by restricting the travel of black-Americans. Heart of Atlanta, 379
U.S. at 253. The Court noted that congressional findings demonstrated qualitia-
tive impact because of the "obvious impairment... that resulted [from continual
uncertainty] of finding lodging." Id. The quantitative impact was that "there was
evidence that this uncertainty stemming from racial discrimination had the effect
of discouraging travel on the part of a substantial portion of the Negro commu-
nity." Id. Even though the regulation legislated morals rather than commerce, the
Court ruled that this fact did not detract from the disruptive effect of racial dis-
crimination on commercial intercourse. Id. at 257.
101. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 299; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 262; see also Hode4
452 U.S. at 276 (holding that Court must determine "whether 'the means chosen
by [Congress are] reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution"'
(quoting Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 262)). In Heart of Atlanta, the Court held that
the question was "if [Congress had a rational] basis [for finding that racial discrim-
ination by motels affected commerce], whether the means it selected to eliminate
that evil are reasonable and appropriate." Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258. Like-
wise, Katzenbach ruled that the courts must determine "whether the [Civil Rights]
Act is a reasonable and appropriate means toward its solution." Katzenbach, 379
U.S. at 299.
102. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 305; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 257.
103. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
104. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04; Heart of Atlanta, 379
U.S. at 258.
105. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04; Heart of Atlanta,
379 U.S. at 258; see also Littman, supra note 64, at 746-47 (concluding that Court
"applies a rational basis test to federal legislation that regulates an activity affecting
interstate commerce... [and] has been extremely deferential to Congress's use of
the commerce power, often looking not only to the text and legislative history of
the law, but even speculating as to Congress's underlying purpose").
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adapted" to the constitutionally permissible ends. 10 6 In applying these
rules, the Court made it clear that courts would uphold most congres-
sional actions as valid exercises of Congress's Commerce Clause power. 10 7
4. United States v. Lopez: Revising the Commerce Clause Rules?
The Supreme Court shocked the legal world in 1995 when it invali-
dated the Gun-Free School Zones Act ("GFSZA") in United States v. Lopez,
as violating the Commerce Clause.' 0 8 Following a historical review of
Commerce Clause litigation over the previous 171 years, the Court divided
the congressional power to regulate under the Commerce Clause into
three categories: (1) the use of interstate commerce channels; (2) the in-
strumentalities of commerce even when the threat is from intrastate activ-
ity; and (3) those activities having a "substantial affect" on interstate
commerce.10 9 The Court then found that GFSZA did not fall within the
106. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294; Heart of Atlanta, 379
U.S. at 241.
107. See Breker-Cooper, supra note 94, at 895 n.22 (noting that since late
1930s, "Court will accept as commerce anything that Congress is likely to legislate
about under that rubric"); James L. Huffman, Lopez Pops Fed's Ballooning Powers,
NAT'i. L.J., May 22, 1995, at A21 (observing that most lawyers have come to accept
that there are no bounds on federal commerce power); Lesser, supra note 53, at
11 ("What we have today is a Congress that shows no reluctance in exercising a
national police power to regulate state and local governments as well as private
parties, and a Supreme Court that has abdicated its historic role as ultimate arbiter
of controversies over federalism."); Littman, supra note 64, at 746 (noting that cur-
rent Commerce Clause test is more amenable to federal legislation).
108. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995); see David 0. Stewart, Back
to the Commerce Clause, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 46 (noting shock resulting from Lopez
ruling which was "the first time in almost 60 years that the Court invalidat[ed] on
Commerce Clause grounds federal legislation regulating private parties"). During
the 1980s and early 1990s, many of the liberal Justices again were replaced by con-
servatives. Reuben, supra note 54, at 78 ("Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has
long espoused a judicial philosophy that includes a healthy regard for state sover-
eignty .... But, after the replacement of the most liberal U] ustices with conserva-
tives .. .Rehnquist's views on federalism now command a majority on the Court
. ...."). This shift may have contributed to the outcome of the case and may indi-
cate another shift in the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
109. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627-30; see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150
(1971) (noting that Commerce Clause reaches three categories of problems);
United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Kan. 1995) (same); United States v.
White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1432 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (noting Court's use in Lopez of
three categories).
The third category is important because the Lopez Court clarified its prior am-
biguous interchange of the terms "affect" and "substantially affect." Compare Heart
of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 241 (using "substantial affect"), and United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 119-20 (1941) (using "substantial affect"), with Hodel, 452 U.S. at 277
(using "affects"), and Perez, 402 U.S. at 150 (using "affecting"), and Polish Nat'l
Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 647 (1944) (using "affects" test). Chief Justice
Rehnquist said that they have always meant "substantially affects": "[A]dmittedly,
our case law has not been clear whether activity must 'affect' or 'substantially af-
fect' interstate commerce.... We conclude ... the proper test requires an analysis
of whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce." Lopez,
115 S. Ct. at 1630; see also White, 893 F. Supp. at 1433 ("The Court clarified in Lopez
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first two categories and could only be constitutional if it met the elements
of the third category.' 10
Despite the absence of legislative history or congressional findings,
the government argued that gun possession in schools "indeed substan-
tially affect[ed] interstate commerce." 'l The Court, however, disagreed
with the government on three grounds.' 12 First, it concluded that the reg-
ulation of gun possession near a school was not a regulation of com-
merce.113 Thus, the Court held that GFSZA "cannot . . . be sustained
under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are
connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce." 114 Second, the Court found
that GFSZA failed to ensure that the firearm possession in question specifi-
cally affected interstate commerce. 115 Finally, the Court rejected the gov-
that for purposes of the final category, 'the proper test requires an analysis of
whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce."' (quot-
ing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629)).
110. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. The Court quickly disposed of the first two
categories stating that § 9 22(q) of the Gun-Free School Zones Act ("GFSZA") "is
not a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce" nor can § 922(q) be
justified as "a regulation by which Congress has sought to protect an instrumentality
of interstate commerce." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the Court concluded that
to sustain GFSZA it must do so under the third category of activities substantially
affecting interstate commerce. Id.
111. Id. at 1632 (discussing government argument that possession of firearm
in school zone may result in violent crime that can be expected to affect national
economy). First, the government said that insurance spreads the costs of violent
crime throughout society. Id. The Court referred to this argument as the "costs of
crime" reasoning. Id. Second, the government contended that violent crime
reduces the incentive for people to travel to unsafe areas. Id. Finally, the govern-
ment argued that guns in schools substantially threaten the learning environment
and, therefore, result in a less trained and a less productive workforce. Id. The
Court referred to this argument as the "national productivity" reasoning. Id. Con-
sequently, the government contended that a less productive citizenry has a "sub-
stantial affect" on the country's economic welfare. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1630-31 ("[Slection 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms.").
114. Id. at 1631. In his dissent, Justice Breyer contended that this holding
created a technical distinction between commerical and noncommercial similar to
those, such as manufacturing and distribution, that the Court abandoned in the
post-New Deal era. Id. at 1663-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1631 ("[Section] 92 2 (q) contains no jurisdictional element that
would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question
affects interstate commerce."); seeUnited States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1213 (6th
Cir. 1995) (noting that lack of jurisdictional element was problematic for Court in
Lopez). The Lopez Court referenced United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971),
where the Court interpreted a statute, which made it a crime for a felon to receive,
possess or transport a firearm in commerce, as requiring an additional nexus to
commerce. Lpez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631; see Sherlin, 67 F.3d at 1213 (upholding consti-
tutionality of federal arson statute, because it contained jurisdictional element);
United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 585 (3d Cir. 1995) (upholding federal
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ernment's argument that a nexus between GFSZA and commerce
existed. 116
The government also contended that possession of a gun in a school
zone may result in violent crime that affects the national economy by in-
creasing insurance costs and by threatening the educational process.11
7
While this reasoning was logical, the Court feared it would permit Con-
gress to regulate all activities that related to the economic productivity of
citizens, no matter how tenuous the nexus.I18 Therefore, the Court found
that acceptance of this reasoning would make it difficult to "posit any ac-
tivity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."1 9
Based on these three factors, the Court held that GFSZA was unconstitu-
tional. 12 0 Yet, because the Court was sharply divided, the long-term im-
pact of the decision is unclear.'2 1
caracking statute because "it contains a 'jurisdictional element' which ostensibly
limits its application to activities substantially related to interstate commerce").
116. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
117. Id.
118. Id. (noting that under government's "national productivity" reasoning,
"Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic
productivity of individual citizens").
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Lopez was a five to four decision and the justices filed numerous concur-
ring and dissenting opinions. Id. at 1625. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the
majority. Id. at 1626. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion that Justice
O'Connerjoined. Id. at 1634 (KennedyJ, concurring). Justice Thomas also filed
a concurring opinion. Id. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring). Additionally, Justice
Stevens and Justice Souter filed dissenting opinions. Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opin-
ion that Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsberg joined. Id. at 1657 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Kennedy emphasized in his concurring opinion that education is tradi-
tionally a concern of the states. Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In addition,
he agreed with the majority opinion that the connection to interstate commerce
was attenuated. Id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Therefore,Justice Kennedy
argued that the Court had a duty to ensure that the "federal-state balance was not
destroyed." Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas argued that the meaning 6f the
constitutional term "commerce" is much narrower than Supreme Court case law
would indicate. Id. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring). In fact, he contended that
the use of a "substantial affects" test is untrue to the Constitution. Id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas argued that an interpretation of the Commerce
Clause that allows regulation of all matter that "substantially affects" interstate
commerce renders much of Congress's other enumerated powers "surplusage."
Id. (ThomasJ., concurring). Finally, he claimed that this construction of the Con-
stitution rendered the Tenth Amendment useless. Id. at 1645 (ThomasJ, concur-
ring). ThusJustice Thomas left open the possibility of further modification of the
Commerce Clause and even a re-examination of the "substantial affects" test. Id.
(Thomas, J., concurring).
The dissenting opinions, however, illustrated a different reading of the Consti-
tution and prior case law. Justice Souter merged the "substantially affects" test with
the Court's deference to Congress in the post-New Deal era: "In reviewing con-
gressional legislation under the Commerce Clause, we defer to what is often a
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III. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND FACE: THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
Cheffer v. Reno12 2 was the first challenge to FACE in a circuit court in
the post-Lopez era.123 In this case, Cheffer and Madsen claimed that the
statute was unconstitutional because Congress lacked the power under the
Commerce Clause to enact the legislation. 12 4 The Eleventh Circuit, how-
ever, rejected that claim. 125
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the rationale expressed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in American Life League, Inc.
merely implicit congressional judgment that its regulation addresses a subject sub-
stantially affecting interstate commerce 'if there is any rational basis for such a
finding."' Id. at 1651 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)). In fact, Justice Souter
argued that the Court adapted the rational basis test because it learned its lesson in
the pre-New Deal era about involving itself in judicial policy judgments. Id. at
1651-52 (Souter, J., dissenting). He contended that if Congress had a rational ba-
sis for enacting the legislation, then the regulated activity substantially affected
interstate commerce. Id. (Souter,J., dissenting). Therefore, he argued for contin-
ued great judicial deference to Congress: "The practice of deferring to rationally
based legislative judgments 'is a paradigm ofjudicial restraint."' Id. at 1651 (Sou-
ter, J., dissenting) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313
(1993)).
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer simply argued that possession of a
gun in a school zone "substantially affected" interstate commerce. Id. at 1657
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Actually, Justice Breyer renamed the test by substituting
"significant" for "substantial." Id. at 1657-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He argued
this interpretation of the test was more consistent with prior case law and allowed
for the incorporation of cumulative effects into the equation. Id. (Breyer, J., dis-
senting); see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (creating cumulative effects
doctrine). Furthermore, he accepted the government's contention that guns af-
fect interstate commerce by destroying the education process as an application of
pre-existing law to changing circumstances. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1662 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Thus, Justice Breyer concluded that the Court had simply created
more legal uncertainty by creating the commercial-noncommercial distinction. Id.
at 1663-64 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
Although some may see Lopez as a dramatic reversal in Commerce Clause law,
many commentators worry about overextending the ruling because of the varied
opinions. See Kester Testimony, supra note 50 (observing that current Court is not
likely to cut back sharply on Commerce Clause, particularly in light of dissenting
opinions). While Lopez has been characterized as a "cautious" opinion, it does lay
the framework for further constraint on congressional power. Kester Testimony,
supra note 50 ("Lopez provides the theory for challenging other federal laws as
unconstitutional if their tie to actual interstate commerce is too tenuous.");
Huffman, supra note 107, at A21 ("ChiefJustice Rehnquist's opinion in Lopez... is
cautious, but it lays the foundation for the recognition of further limits on congres-
sional power.").
122. 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995).
123. The Supreme Court decided Lopez on April 26, 1995 and the Eleventh
Circuit handed down its opinion in Cheffer v. Reno on June 23, 1995. Lopez, 115 S.
Ct. at 1624; Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1517.
124. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1518. For a further discussion of alternative claims
raised by Cheffer and Madsen, see supra note 17.
125. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1521.
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v. Reno, 126 a pre-Lopez decision regarding the Commerce Clause issue.12 7
American Life League was also a challenge to Congress's power to enact
FACE in which the court held that Congress had the power under the
Commerce Clause to enact the legislation. 128 The Fourth Circuit ex-
plained that a federal statute is valid under the Commerce Clause if Con-
gress meets the two standards enumerated in Jones & Laughlin Steel and its
progeny.' 2 9 First, Congress must rationally conclude that the regulated
activity affects interstate commerce. 130 Second, Congress must choose a
regulatory means reasonably adapted to a permissible end.1 3 '
The American Life League court held that Congress rationally con-
cluded that abortion protest activity affects interstate commerce.13 2 In
support of this position, the court looked to the four connections between
protest activity and commerce found in the legislative history of FACE.13 3
First, the court noted that women travel across state lines for reproductive
health care services. 134 Second, the court concluded that abortion clinics
engage personnel in an interstate market.13 5 Third, abortion facilities buy
medical and office supplies that move in interstate commerce. 136 Finally,
the court referred to "clinics [that] have been closed because of blockades
and sabotage and have been rendered unable to provide services."' 13 7
These four connections signaled to the court that Congress arrived at a
126. 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995).
127. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1519-21; American Life League, 47 F.3d. at 642.
128. American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 855 F. Supp. 137, 141 (E.D. Va.
1994), affid, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995). American Life League was also a pre-emp-
tive challenge to the constitutionality of FACE. Id. at 139. While the plaintiffs
were not charged for violation of the law, they feared its enforcement. Id.
Although they claimed to be a nonviolent and peaceful group, the plaintiffs al-
leged that the mere number of protesters that had participated with them "ha[d]
caused and will cause physical obstruction of the entrance to facilities providing
reproductive health care." Id. at 140.
129. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 647.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (holding that Congress rationally concluded that abortion violence
affected interstate commerce).
133. Id.
134. Id. ("Many women travel across state lines to seek reproductive health
care.").
135. Id. ("Reproductive health facilities engage doctors and other staff in an
interstate market."). The Fourth Circuit used Dr. Gunn, a murdered abortion doc-
tor, as an example of a physician who performed abortions in several states. Id.; see
also H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 7-8 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.S.CA.N. 699, 704
(noting that Dr. Gunn performed abortions in several states); S. REP. No. 103-117,
at 3 (1993) (same). For a further discussion of Dr. Gunn, see supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
136. American Life League, 47 F.3d at 647 ("These facilities buy medical and
office supplies that move in interstate commerce.").
137. Id. (referencing S. REP. No. 103-117, at 31).
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rational conclusion concerning the effect of abortion protests on inter-
state commerce.
138
The American Life League court next ruled that Congress chose a regu-
latory means reasonably adapted to a permissible end by creating criminal
and civil penalties for certain types of abortion protest.13 9 The court held
that criminal and civil penalties were "designed to deter violent, obstruc-
tive and destructive conduct. ' 140 In addition, the court ruled that these
penalties were reasonably adapted to achieve the Act's five permissible
ends:
(1) protecting the free flow of goods and services in commerce,
(2) protecting patients in their use of the lawful services of repro-
ductive health facilities, (3) protecting women when they exer-
cise their constitutional right to choose an abortion, (4)
protecting the safety of reproductive health care providers, and
(5) protecting reproductive health care facilities from physical
destruction and damage. 141
Having passed both the rational basis and the reasonable relation tests, the
Fourth Circuit held that FACE constituted a constitutional enactment
under the Commerce Clause. 142
Subsequent to its adoption of the American Life League rationale, the
Eleventh Circuit dismissed the Lopez decision. 143 The court recognized
that Congress had failed to make findings on whether GFSZA fell within
its authority under the Commerce Clause.144 Then, the court interpreted
the holding in Lopez to mean that GFSZA was invalid because it neither
138. Id. (holding "[f]rom these facts Congress concluded that interstate com-
merce was threatened") (citing S. REP. No. 103-117, at 31).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995).
144. Id. at 1520. The Eleventh Circuit notes that Congress is not required to
make findings, but that such findings help the courts determine if the regulated
activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce. Id. The Supreme Court has
often held that Congress is not required to make findings. See Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) ("Congress need [not] make particularized find-
ings in order to legislate."); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (not-
ing that Congress's failure to include formal findings was "not fatal to the validity
of the statute"). Nevertheless, findings are helpful to the Court. United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995). As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Lopez:
Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the sub-
stantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce .... But to
the extent that congressional findings could enable us to evaluate the
legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected in-
terstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to
the naked eye, they are lacking here.
Id. at 1361-62 (citations omitted). Some commentators believe that judges have an
obligation to insist that Congress provide express findings of purpose in legisla-
tion. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Federalism in the Future, in FEDERALISM: THE SHIFT-
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regulated commercial activity nor required that the possession of a fire-
arm in a school be related to interstate commerce in any way.
1 45
Having outlined what it believed to be the relevant portions of the
Lopez opinion, the court then distinguished FACE from GFSZA.' 46 First,
the court differentiated the two cases by explaining American Life League
enumeration of the legislative findings regarding FACE. 14 7 Based on
these findings, it ruled that, unlike GFSZA, FACE regulated commerce by
"protecting the commercial activities of reproductive health providers."' 148
Without explanation, the court concluded that Congress's findings were
"plausible and provide a rational basis" for determining that abortion pro-
test violence "substantially affects" interstate commerce. 149 Based on this
analysis, it held that FACE represented a constitutional exercise of power
under the Commerce Clause.1 50
IV. A MISGUIDED APPLICATION OF COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
TO FACE
In Cheffer, the Eleventh Circuit did not fully recognize the importance
of the holding and rationale of Lopez. Granted, the Cheffer court correctly
determined that if the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate
abortion protest, such regulation must be justified under the "substantially
affects" interstate commerce test.15 1 The court nonetheless failed to accu-
rately apply the "substantially affects" test.152 In essence, the court failed
to recognize that FACE does not regulate commerce, to consider the ab-
ING BALANCE 56 (Janice C. Griffith ed., 1989) ("[Jludges must insist that Congress
be explicit in its purpose to subject the states to a federal regulatory measure.").
145. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520.
146. Id. at 1521-22.
147. Id. at 1520.
148. Id. In a citation to Lopez, the court acknowledged that the Supreme
Court defined the proper standard to be "substantially affects" but it did not ad-
dress how the congressional findings illustrate "substantial effect." Id. (referring to
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630).
149. Id. at 1520-21.
150. Id. at 1521.
151. Id.; Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791, 806-07 (W.D.N.C. 1996) (implic-
itly holding that FACE falls in third category); United States v. Scott, 919 F. Supp.
76 (D. Conn. 1996) (same). But see United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919
(8th Cir. 1996) (holding that FACE falls within second and third Lopez category).
The Cheffer court impliedly placed FACE into the third category by ignoring the
other two categories and considering the "substantially affects" test. Cheffer, 55
F.3d at 1518. For a further discussion of the three categories of commerce regula-
tion outlined in Lopez, see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
152. Cheffer, 53 F.3d at 1520. For a further discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's
misapplication of the "substantially affects" test, see infra notes 153-63 and accom-
panying text. The Eleventh Circuit is not the only circuit that failed to recognize
the importance of the Lopez test. In fact, the Seventh Circuit addressed whether
FACE violated the Commerce Clause without even citing Lopez. United States v.
Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding FACE did not violate Commerce
Clause).
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sence of a jurisdictional element and to contemplate the availability of
remedies on the state level. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit's cursory review of
FACE was a misguided application of Commerce Clause jurisprudence af-
ter Lopez.
A. Failure to Apply the "Substantially Affects" Test and the
Resulting Cursory Judicial Review
The Eleventh Circuit did not undertake an investigation into whether
the regulated activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce. As the
court noted, there were some legislative findings in FACE that provided
Congress with a rational basis to conclude that abortion clinic protests af-
fect interstate commerce.153 Nevertheless, the Cheffer court erred by
merely adopting the congressional findings without independently inquir-
ing whether the effect on interstate commerce was substantial.' 5 4 Con-
gress concluded that its own action was within the Commerce Clause
power. Therefore, the court deferred to Congress without further inquiry
and abandoned its role as the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution.15 5 As a
result, the court applied the pre-Lopez line of reasoning to conclude that
because Congress had a rational basis there must be a substantial effect. 156
153. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520. For a further discussion of the congressional
findings regarding FACE, see supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
154. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520. After reviewing the congressional findings, the
court simply held that the findings illustrate that "[FACE] protects and regulates
commercial enterprises operating in interstate commerce." Id. Arguably, FACE
regulates the actions of private individuals outside the industry. United States v.
Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 624, 621 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
155. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520. It is very important that courts strike the proper
balance between deference to the legislature and active review of the legislature.
Otherwise, courts will begin to execute the role of the legislature by making policy
decisions. This constitutional tension, however, even perplexes the Supreme
Court. Lopez, 113 S. Ct. at 1624 (Souter,J., dissenting) (noting that judicial activ-
ism in area of Commerce Clause questions involves Court in policy decisions).
Nevertheless, the Court has decided it sometimes must review congressional ac-
tion, rather than simply look for a rational basis, or else Congress is the only insti-
tution reviewing the constitutionality of its actions. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface
and Mining Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981) ("Simply because Con-
gress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate com-
merce does not necessarily make it so.") (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964) (urging that it isjudicial inquiry to determine whether something affects interstate commerce suffi-
ciently to come under Congress's constitutional power) (Black, J., concurring);
United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that federal courts
play role in regulating exercise of congressional power). See generally Kramer, supra
note 2, at 1495 (arguing that Framers intended courts to play role in policing
limits on power of national government).
156. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520-21 (holding that Congress's findings provide ra-
tional basis for concluding that FACE is constitutional). The result of deference as
extreme as that in Cheffer is a cursory review because the court conclusorily states
that congressional findings illustrate a rational basis without articulating how the
findings demonstrate a rational basis. As the court noted in United States v. Wilson,
880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1995), "the Court does not defer to the Congress
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The Supreme Court in Lopez, however, abandoned this rational basis
test and created a higher standard in the "substantial affects" test.1 57 Had
the Court desired to keep the rational basis test, it simply could have held
that Congress made no findings regarding GFSZA, and it was thus unable
to determine if Congress had a rational basis. By proceeding in that man-
ner, the Court could have held GFSZA unconstitutional without altering
the Commerce Clause test. Because the Court ruled otherwise, Lopez rein-
stated judicial review in Commerce Clause cases and abandoned the blind
deference to Congress that accompanied the traditional rational basis test.
By merely adopting Congress's findings, the Eleventh Circuit made
little more than a cursory review of the legislature's basis for enacting
FACE, thereby ignoring the mandate of the Lopez Court. 15 8 The Supreme
Court's abandonment of the rational basis test demands that lower courts
now scrutinize Congress's rationale much more closely.159 The Eleventh
simply because it has acted rationally in a purely 'logical' sense. For there may
always be a plausible rationale for Congressional action that meets the require-
ment of simple logic." Id. at 625. Thus, the rational basis test, as applied in Cheffer,
was, in practice, a logical basis test. Id.
157. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. The Lopez Court concluded that the proper test
"requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' inter-
state commerce" and not whether Congress had a rational basis to determine if the
regulated activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce. Id. The abandon-
ment of the rational basis test in the third category, which includes the cases with
the most tenuous tie to interstate commerce, is logical and based on a textual
reading of the Constitution. As two commentators have noted: "To meet the re-
quirements of legitimate interpretation, the [Commerce] [C]lause must properly
be limited by its language. At a minimum, in order to be an appropriate subject
for regulation, the regulated activity must.. . at least have a non-negligible impact
upon commerce [that crosses state lines]." Martin Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Con-
stitutional Federalism and Judicial Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L.
Riv. 1, 41 (1987). Without such a tie, the Commerce Clause would encompass all
activity. Id. Therefore, in areas that implicate federalism, i.e., the Commerce
Clause and Tenth Amendment conflict, the question of whether a rational basis
standard is appropriate is debatable. Id. at 49.
158. Cursory review was one of the problems with the rational basis test.
David Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88
Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 683 (1994) ("The Court largely evaluates ... action under the
rational basis test with the lights turned out."); Redish & Drizin, supra note 157, at
45-47 (arguing that while rational basis test has been used to "disguise abstention,"
it could be and should be more meaningful test). But see ChristopherJ. Sprigman,
Comment, Standing on Firmer Ground: Separation of Powers and Deference to Congres-
sionalFindings in the Standing Analysis, 59 U. CHm. L. REv. 1645, 1665 (1992) (noting
that Supreme Court is content with "rationality" test rather than "an unguided
judicial inquiry").
159. Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791, 817 (W.D.N.C. 1996) ("[Iun Lopez
... the Supreme Court affirmed the traditional duty of Article III courts to deter-
mine whether a congressional enactment exceeds the scope of the commerce
power and demonstrated that deferential judicial review cannot be equated with
judicial obsequience."). A cursory review is not true to the text of the Constitution
because it renders the enumeration of powers in Article I and the constraints in
the Tenth Amendment meaningless. Redish & Drizin, supra note 157, at 47. Thus,
the courts must play a role in ensuring Congress does not overstep its constitu-
tional bounds. Bishop, 66 F.3d at 577. As the court said in Bishop:
900 [Vol. 41: p. 867
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Circuit should have conducted a deeper analysis of the congressional ra-
tionale in order to determine if the regulated activity substantially affected
interstate commerce. 160 The Eleventh Circuit, for example, relied upon a
congressional finding that the problem of abortion protest violence is na-
tionwide in scope. 161 After Lopez, however, it is not sufficient that a prob-
lem is national in scope.1 62 Rather, the only proper inquiry remaining is
whether the problem substantially affects interstate commerce. 163
B. FACE on Its Face
The Cheffer court also failed to realize that FACE, like GFSZA, does
not regulate commerce or economic activity on its face.164 Rather, FACE
regulates activity one step removed from commerce by prohibiting actions
of those persons outside the abortion industry.165 Thus, FACE differs
from the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach, which
directly regulated commercial activity, and is analogous to GFSZA struck
down in Lopez. 166
[T]he federal courts must also play a role in regulating the exercise of
Congressional power: When the conduct of an enterprise affects com-
merce among the States is a matter of practical judgment, not to be deter-
mined by abstract notions . . . [the Court was given the power] of
determining whether the Congress has exceeded limits allowable in rea-
son for the judgment it has exercised.
Id. Closer judicial scrutiny achieves this goal.
160. For a further discussion of the Court's abandonment of the rational basis
test, see supra notes 155-57, and accompanying text.
161. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520; see also Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 631 ("Congress
found that the problem is nationwide in scope and beyond the ability of states to
control.").
162. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 631 (holding that abortion violence was nation-
wide in scope did not prove "substantial effect" on interstate commerce); see also
Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 807 ("The mere fact that Congress believes a problem is
national in scope does not warrant ignoring the constitutional requirement that an
activity must have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.").
163. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 631. As the dissent noted in Perez v. United States,
"[iut is not enough to say that [the crime] . . .is a national problem . . .for...
interstate business suffers from almost all criminal activity be it shoplifting or vio-
lence in the streets." Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1971) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
Similarly, the states' failure to control a problem like abortion violence, does
not prove a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at
631. Indeed, the court found that with an increasing crime rate, such a finding
would allow Congress to regulate all criminal activities that the states traditionally
regulated. Id.
164. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 628 ("Unlike Title II [of the Civil Rights Act of
1964], FACE does not regulate commercial entities, but rather regulates private
conduct affecting commercial entities which in turn receive goods that have trav-
eled in interstate commerce."); see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-31
(1995) (holding that FACE has nothing to do with commerce).
165. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 628 (holding that "Congress chose to regulate
conduct one step removed from commercial enterprise" in enacting FACE).
166. Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 813 ("[FACE] purports to regulate the activity
of persons who protest outside abortion clinics and here, as in Lopez, the regulated
35
Scheib: Cheffer v. Reno: Is the Regulation of Abortion Clinic Protests th
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
FACE does not regulate an activity that is commercial or economic in
nature because FACE is not an inherently commercial statute. 167 In
FACE, the economic impact centers on clinics, while the regulation fo-
cuses on individual protesters. 168 Therefore, FACE regulates local, indi-
vidual conduct such as injuring, intimidating or interfering by force,
threat of force or physical obstruction.1 69 While interstate commerce may
encompass the regulation of health care services, FACE does not regulate
the commercial activity of reproductive care or reproductive care provid-
activity is not commerce or economic enterprise, however broadly one might de-
fine those terms."); Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 628 ("Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach
might provide precedent for regulating clinics themselves, but they do not provide
precedent for regulating private conduct affecting those clinics."). The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 regulated commercial participants: hotels and restaurants. 42
U.S.C. § 2000a to 2000a-6 (1994).
167. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 628 (noting that unlike Wickard, there is "simply
no national commercial regulatory scheme"); see also Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 810-
11 (holding that when Congress acts pursuant to Commerce Clause power, it must
link its regulation to activities having explicit connection with interstate com-
merce, but that in FACE Congress failed to do so).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1)-(3) (1994); see also Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 809
("FACE is not aimed at the commercial activity of abortion clinics. It is aimed at
the basic freedom of individuals to engage in civil protest."); Wilson, 880 F. Supp.
at 628 (holding that "FACE does not regulate commercial entities, but rather regu-
lates private conduct"). For the language of the statute, see supra note 44.
169. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1)-(3). For the language of the statute, see supra
note 44.
[Vol. 41: p. 867
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ers. 170 Thus, the aggregate effect of abortion protests is too insubstantial
to be considered inherently commercial. 171
Finally, as in Lopez, the nexus between abortion protest violence and
interstate commerce was insufficient to link FACE to commercial activ-
ity.172 The argument is as follows: abortion protests prevent clinics from
operating; consequently, the need for doctors' services and supplies and
the availability of abortion procedures decreases. 173 This reasoning, how-
ever, exhibits an effect on commerce that is solely logical. 174 All activity
can be characterized as affecting commerce in a logical sense. 175 There-
fore, if there are limits to the scope of the Commerce Clause, as the
170. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1)-(3). The Cheffer court recognized the economic
impact on abortion clinics. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1995).
It claimed FACE protected the commercial enterprises of reproductive service
providers operating in interstate commerce. Id. Nevertheless, FACE regulates in-
dividual protest activity rather than abortion clinics. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (1)-(3); see
also Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 809. But see Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin, Operation
Rescue Versus a Woman's Right to Choose: A Conflict Without a Federal Remedy?, 32 DuQ.
L. REv. 709 (1995) (arguing that FACE regulates commerce that is interstate in
nature).
Similarly, in GFSZA, the economic impact centered on schools, and the regu-
lation focused on individual conduct near, but unrelated to, schools. United
States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-31 (1995) ("Section 9 22(q) is a criminal
statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
eriterprise .... "); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that Lopez refused to apply prior
case law to statute that had nothing to do with commerce). In Lopez, the govern-
ment contended that: "[T] he presence of guns in schools poses a substantial threat
to the educational process by threatening the learning environment. A handi-
capped educational process, in turn, will result in a less productive citizenry, that
in turn would have an adverse effect on the Nation's economic well being." Lopez,
115 S. Ct. at 1632. Clearly, this argument demonstrates that the economic impact
of GFSZA was on schools. Nevertheless, the law regulated personal possession of a
firearm rather than possession in schools. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).
Although the Eleventh Circuit could have relied on a Wickard aggregation
analysis, Lopez clearly warned not to overextend that holding. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at
1624; see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1941) (creating cumulative affect analy-
sis in Commerce Clause cases). Specifically, the Court said that the Wickard line of
cases "may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so
indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and
create a completely centralized government." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-30. The
Lopez Court noted that Wickard involved a statute which regulated an activity that
was economic and commercial in nature-the production of wheat. Id.
171. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 628.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 630-32.
174. Id. at 630 (noting that for practical purposes "all persons and all entities
operate within the stream of commerce").
175. Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791, 807 (W.D.N.C. 1996) ("Congress'
reasoning calls to mind the idiom that little fleas have littler fleas on thier backs to
bite them and littler fleas have littler fleas on their backs to bite them and so on ad
infinitum."); Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 630 ("All activity 'affects' commerce because
virtually all activity requires commerce and all commerce requires activity.").
1996] NOTE 903
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Supreme Court has held there are, then the connection must be more
than logical to rise to the level of "substantially affects." 176 Thus, the tenu-
ous connection between abortion protest and commerce does not reach
the level of "substantially affect."
C. The Missing Jurisdictional Element
The Cheffer court also did not consider the significance of a jurisdic-
tional element. A jurisdictional element allows for a case-by-case inquiry
that ensures that the particular action in question substantially affected
interstate commerce. 177 Without ajurisdictional element, there is no as-
surance of a relationship between a law, its enforcement and the Com-
merce Clause. For example, the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 each had a jurisdic-
tional element and the Supreme Court upheld their enactment as a regu-
lation of commerce. 178 Indeed, the National Labor Relations Act and the
Fair Labor Standards Act defined what constituted "affecting com-
merce."' 79 Likewise, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 defined what activities in
the restaurant and hotel industry constituted interstate commerce and
therefore subjected these businesses to the Act.180
By contrast, GFSZA did not contain ajurisdictional element.' 8 ' The
absence of such an element represented another factor in the Court's
176. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 630 (noting that if courts accept merely logical
connections, "no one is immune from federal regulation under the Commerce
power").
177. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1625 (1995) ("922(q) contains
no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through a case-by-case inquiry, that
the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce."); United States v.
Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208 (6th Cir. 1995) (upholding federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(i), because it contained jurisdictional element that ensures arson in ques-
tion affects interstate commerce), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795 (1996); United States
v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995) (upholding federal carjacking statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2119, noting that section "contains ajurisdictional element which ostensi-
bly limits its application to activities substantially related to interstate commerce");
United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 234, 237 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding federal
carjacking statute noting that "the statute ... included the requirement of a case-
by-case showing of a nexus between the intrastate activity and interstate com-
merce"); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (uphold-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), stating "that the firearm hav[ing] been, at some time, in
interstate commerce is sufficient to establish its constitutionality under the Com-
merce Clause").
178. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1994) (National Labor Relations Act); 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (Fair Labor Standards Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to 2000a-6 (1994) (Civil
Rights Act of 1964); see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964) (same); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor
Standards Act); NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (up-
holding NLRA).
179. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168; 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to 2000a-6.
181. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
904 [Vol. 41: p. 867
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striking down the statute in Lopez.18 2 Like GFSZA, FACE also lacks ajuris-
dictional element.'8 3 Therefore, the absence of such an element should
have concerned the Eleventh Circuit in the Cheffer decision.18 4 The Cheffer
court, however, failed to address this issue.
D. Ignoring Other Remedies: Another Nail in Federalism's Coffin
The Eleventh Circuit did not contemplate the impact of finding
FACE constitutional. The laws of the individual states, injunctions and the
availability of the federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tion Act adequately remedy abortion clinic violence. 185 Similar to GFSZA
182. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (holding that GFSZA did not contain jurisdic-
tional element); see Sherlin, 67 F.3d at 1213 (noting that lack of jurisdictional ele-
ment was problematic in Lopez), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795 (1996); see also David F.
Pike, Law on Guns Near Schools is Overturned, LA. DAILY J., Apr. 27, 1995, at Al
("The law also lacks a jurisdictional element that would ensure, through case-by-
case inquiry, that the gun possession has the requisite nexus with interstate
commerce.").
183. 18 U.S.C. § 248.
184. Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791, 813 (W.D.N.C. 1996). As the court
noted in Hoffman:
[E]ven if Congress could properly regulate the Plaintiff's protest activities
and rationally conclude that those activities substantially affect interstate
commerce, [FACE] does not contain an express jurisdiction element
which would ensure, through a case-by-case inquiry, that the noncommer-
cial activity regulated by the statute has an explicit connection with or
effect on interstate commerce.
Id.
185. Since the founders adopted our federal system of governance, the police
power resided with the states. Among these traditional state powers is the power to
make certain actions criminal. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (ruling
that federal intrusion into state criminal trials frustrate state's sovereign power);
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) (holding that states possess pri-
mary authority over criminal law); United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360,
1363 (D. Ariz. 1995) (holding that states possess primary authority over criminal
law).
Additionally, in a footnote in Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist reminded the
Court that the primary authority for defining and enforcing criminal law belonged
to the states. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 n.3. Furthermore, he noted that "[w]hen
Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal by the States, it ef-
fects a 'change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdic-
tion."' Id. (quoting United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973)).
In the case of FACE, when the violence is disassociated from abortion, the
laws of the individual states provide the remedies for the underlying crime. As one
commentator noted:
Stripped of its ideological aspects, [the murder of an abortion doctor in
Pensacola, Florida] is a routine homicide, not distinguishable at law from
any of the 25,000 other murders that will occur across the nation this
year. The city of Pensacola is perfectly capable of trying the accused.
Why should federal prosecutors and judges intervene? In recent years
Congress has fallen into a bad habit of pre-empting state and local juris-
diction in criminal cases.
James Kilpatrick, Abortion Clinic Act Just the Latest Intrusion on Local Law Enforcement,
COLUMBIAN, Aug. 23, 1994, at All.
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in Lopez, FACE is redundant in light of state and other federal law and it
significantly alters the delicate balance of federalism.1 8 6 Yet, the Eleventh
Circuit failed to comprehend that FACE expands federal criminal law to
cover special instances of trespass, assault, battery or murder, and topples
the balance of power between the states and the federal government.1 87
V. INADEQUACY OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION: A MODEL NOT
WORTH IMITATING
The Eleventh Circuit erroneously upheld FACE as a constitutional en-
actment under the Commerce Clause. In particular, it did not fully con-
sider the holding and rationale of the Supreme Court's most recent
Commerce Clause decision in Lopez.1 88 Because the court did not engage
in the proper analysis, Congress itself was left as the only institution deter-
The Supreme Court also approved the use of injunctions against abortion
protestors. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 907 (1994); see Melissa Wal-
ler Baldwin, An Example of Creating Law Through the First Amendment, 21 Omo N.U.
L. REv. 1101 (reviewing and analyzing Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.). See generally
Hilber, supra note 7, at 152-56 (discussing use of injunctions); Lockwood, supra
note 37, at 1017-27 (discussing use of injunctions against abortion protestors).
Finally, the Supreme Court approved the use of RICO against abortion protes-
tors. NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994); see David Baarlaer, National Organi-
zation v. Scheidler, 21 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 1085 (1995) (reviewing and analyzing
Court's ruling in NOW v. Scheidler). See generally Hilber, supra note 7, at 157-58
(discussing use of RICO against abortion protestors); Lockwood, supra note 37, at
1012-17 (same). The Supreme Court held, however, that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
could not be used against abortion protestors because the protests were not aimed
at women, but at the practice of abortion. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). See generally Hilber, supra note 7, at 160-61 (discuss-
ing Bray); Lockwood, supra note 37, at 1000-04 (discussing Court's ruling in Bray).
These remedies are analogous to the state laws in over forty states that pro-
hibit the possession of guns in schools prior to the enactment of GFSZA. Thomas
Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judi-
ciaiy from the Federalization of State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 503, 504 (1995) ("Con-
gress's action [in enacting GFSZA] is particularly odd given that nearly every state
punishes firearm possession on school grounds as a crime.").
186. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1638 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Were the Federal
Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern,
areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the bound-
aries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur."); see also
United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that Congress improp-
erly interfered with NewJersey's right to define crimes of violence and that intra-
state crimes are left to states); United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 528
(9th Cir. 1995) (applying Lopez substantial affects test to reject federal court juris-
diction over prosecution under federal arson statute noting that: "[T]his is a sim-
ple state arson crime. It should have been tried in state court.").
187. Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 814 (holding that validation of FACE would
"eviscerate the limited government secured by the enumeration of federal powers
contained in the Constitution"); see also Hilber, supra note 7, at 165 ("The local
nature of protestor's offenses challenges [FACE] because the legislation appears to
reach into areas normally governed by the states.").
188. For a comparison of Lopez and Cheffer, see supra notes 151-87 and accom-
panying text.
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mining the constitutionality of FACE.18 9 In essence, the court failed to
exercise judicial review under the constitutional system of checks and bal-
ances. 190 Therefore, the court's cursory review and failure to recognize
Lopez's heightened "substantially affects" test provides no guidance for
other courts.19 1 Future courts must not abdicate their role of judicial re-
view when considering whether the regulation of abortion clinic violence
is the regulation of interstate commerce, and thus within Congress's Com-
merce Clause power. 19 2
John M. Scheib
189. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 451 U.S. 264
(1981) ("[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.").
190. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1801) (establishing
power of judicial review).
191. For a further discussion of the Cheffer court's failure to recognize the
heightened "substantially affects" test, see supra notes 153-63 and accompanying
text.
192. William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603, 603-08 (1975). One commentator argued that the Court
had not deferred to congressional decisions of constitutionality until Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Cohen, supra, at 605. He further argued that the
distinction between permissible and impermissible congressional constitutional in-
terpretation depends "on the ability of the congressional staff to supply the appro-
priate testimony in hearings and to draft a statutory preamble picking the proper
purpose." Id. at 608.
Another commentator also noted that the problem of defining when and how
far a court should defer to congressional findings is not new. Archibald Cox, The
Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CINN. L. REv. 199, 200 (1971);
see also Faigman, supra note 158, at 653 ("Complaints of a legislative judiciary are at
least as old as judicial review itself .. "). In addition, he notes that "although the
Supreme Court purports to say that the challenged measure is constitutional, in
truth the decision is only that the measure does not conflict with the Constitution
given the findings and judgment that Congress has expressed." Id.; see also Faigman, supra
note 158, at 683 ("[R] ational basis review is equivalent to finding the Constitution
not implicated.").
1996] NOTE 907
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